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The goal of this research is to identify the effects of a local collective action 
management plan on irrigators in Kansas. I compare changes in water use decisions 
of irrigators located inside the policy boundary to changes in water use decisions 
of irrigators located within a five mile buffer surrounding the Sheridan County 6 
Local Enhanced Management Area (LEMA). I use a Difference-in-Difference 
regression model to estimate the effects of the LEMA on irrigated acreage, 
irrigation intensity, and crop type to uncover the adaptation strategies adopted by 
farmers. I also estimate how the LEMA impacted crop yields and the use of 
agricultural inputs such as herbicides, pesticides, fertilizer, and seed. The key 
assumption for the empirical model is that irrigation decisions inside the LEMA 
boundary would have followed the same trend as those in the 5 mile boundary if the 
LEMA water use restriction had not been in place.  
The change in total water use is decomposed into three adjustments: changes in 
irrigated acreage (extensive margin), changes in applied water intensity on the same 
crop (direct intensive margin), and changes in crop allocations (indirect intensive 
margin). My results indicate that the LEMA caused a reduction in total water use of 
25%. The total change in water use was due to a 4% reduction at the extensive margin, 
19% at the direct intensive margin and 3% at the indirect intensive margin. The LEMA 
resulted in an 8% reduction in corn yield and a 4% reduction to soybean yield, the 
primary crops in the region. I further estimate that the changes in cropping patterns due 
  
to changes at the extensive margin result in a 15% reduction in agricultural input 
expenditures through changes in cropping patterns. 
This study improves our understanding of the effects of this type of policy and 
provides implications for future water policy management initiatives. Global 
considerations of depleted groundwater resources have become of greater concern 
and initiatives such as the Sheridan County 6 LEMA could offer alternative 
strategies for effective resource management through a collective action 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 1.1 US Groundwater Policy Management 
Depleting groundwater resources has become a crucial topic across the US. The 
High Plains Aquifer is the largest groundwater storage reservoir in the US covering 
174,000 square miles (110 million acres) of the Great Plains stretching across eight 
states including Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming (McGuire, 2002) (Figure 1).  
According to the US Department of the Interior, the future of secure water 
supplies is impacted by increasing competing demands from population growth, 
agriculture, development and climate change. This drives the necessity for states 
and local communities to provide leadership and enactment of policies to increase 
water resources, restore watersheds and invest in programs and management 
strategies that contribute to reversing the growing water crises across the US. 
Defining specific water policy directives for water quality or quantity issues can be 
difficult, however, with various stakeholders having opposing points of interest. 
Over time increased groundwater pumping from various uses has resulted in 
substantial water table declines across the aquifer. Although irrigated agriculture is 
fed from both surface and groundwater, the over-exploitation of the aquifer’s 
resources could significantly change the landscape of crop production in the US. 
Sixty percent of US irrigated land relies directly on groundwater pumping and 
irrigated land over the High Plains account for roughly 27%, making it the largest 












Figure 1: Map of the High Plains Aquifer 
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Concerns about depleted aquifers for agricultural production are not unique to 
the Great Plains. Groundwater extraction for irrigation provides a substantial 
increase in crop yields and stabilizes profits due to uncertain weather; however, 
using data from NASA’s GRACE satellite, Famiglietti (2014) found that 
groundwater is being depleted in the largest global agricultural zones that could 
decrease crop production and subsequently raise food prices. In response to the 
growing concern over appropriate management of the aquifer farmers in Sheridan 
County, Kansas helped to form a Local Enhanced Management Area (LEMA) in 
an effort to self-regulate their water use (Figure 2).  
Ostrom (2009) described factors that lead to collective action indicating that 
users of a resource will invest their time and energy and self-organize to avert a 
tragedy of the commons when it becomes profitable to do so. This occurs when 
benefits exceed the perceived costs of regulation. Although joint benefits may be 
established between users, self-organizing to sustain a resource increases time 
burdens for the users and could result in a loss of short-term economic gains causing 
users to avoid these costly changes and continue to overuse the resource. Farmers 
may be more likely to pursue these collective action efforts to the extent that they 
can adapt to water restrictions and offset the short-run negative impacts. The results 


















Figure 2: Map of Sheridan 6 Local Enhanced Management Area LEMA 
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 1.2 Background on the Sheridan 6 LEMA 
In 2012, new legislation granted Kansas Groundwater Management Districts 
(GMDs) the power to originate their own localized water conservation management 
plans which are then legally enforced by the state). Farmers in Sheridan County, 
located in the northwestern corner of Kansas participated in the process to impose 
restrictions on themselves by forming a Local Enhanced Management Area 
(LEMA) in 2013 as a collective action effort to regulate their water use.  
As described by the order of the Chief Engineer, the overarching goal of the 
LEMA is a collective action to restrict irrigated groundwater rights to no more than 
114,000 acre-feet total over January 1, 2013, and December 31, 2017, in a manner 
that preserves the economic benefits of irrigation further into the future. The 99 
square mile area maintains 185 wells for irrigation and 10 non-irrigation wells and 
puts in place the goal of reducing groundwater pumping by approximately 20% 
whereby restricting irrigators to a five-year allocation of 55 inches/acre each (KDA, 
2013).  
In July of 2012, the Sheridan 6 LEMA proposal was transmitted to the Division 
of Water Resources (DWR) including the legal descriptions of sections to be 
included in the LEMA and goals and management actions for limiting water use. 
The proposal was generated through a public consensus process undertaken by the 
stakeholders of the SD-6 High Priority Area over the course of eleven noticed 
meetings and two subcommittee meetings beginning in 2008. The proposed LEMA 
including all wells located in the high priority area, not just wells of irrigators who 
6 
may have been in favor of the water policy. Although the LEMA was in part farmer-
led, the resulting defined boundary was formally decided externally, by the SD-6 
advisory board that consisted of not only residents, owners, and operators but also 
representatives from the Division of Water Resources, Kansas Department of 
Agriculture, and Groundwater Management District 4. The notes from the June 17, 
2009 meeting outlined exactly how the boundary was defined as follows: 
The observation wells were used to generate an interpolated water 
level value for the center of every section. The 1997 section-center 
values were subtracted from the 2006 values and any section that 
declined 9% or more was identified. The reported water use was also 
aggregated for every section and any section that had more than 275 
acre feet of annually reported water use was identified. Next, any ¼ 
Township that had two or more identified sections, was designated as 
a High Priority Area ¼ Township. Finally, the ¼ Townships were 
combined to form the 6 High Priority Areas. 
Many farmers who spoke out in support of the LEMA indicated that they felt 
that the LEMA provided enough flexibility in water allocation from year to year 
such that farmers would capitalize on their abilities to adapt and could actually be 
more profitable allowing future generations to continue irrigation practices. It is 
noted when questioned about how the irrigators felt the water restriction might 
impact their profits in one of the policy planning meetings, one farmer replied, 
“We’ll probably net more (profits)...”. This did not come without criticisms; 
however, with other farmers pointing out possible disproportionate water use based 
on unequal water right allocations between farmers within the restricted boundaries 
7 
and a possible result of increased water use due to unlimited flexibility of allocation 
between water rights and unlimited well locations. Some argued this gives farmers 
the ability to purchase additional water rights to irrigate their present place of use 
causing potential for more water use than before the LEMA (KDA, 2013).  
The water management plan is of interest to many due to its uncommon 
collective action establishment with direct input from the irrigators who have an 
interest in extending the life of the aquifer. The boundaries contained within the 
LEMA are defined by critical groundwater conditions and discussions about new 
LEMA enactment are currently being initiated in GMDs across the state. This 
includes GMD 4 in its entirety, five west-central counties (GMD 1), and 12 south-
west counties (GMD 3) suggesting more farmers will be under these quantity 
restrictive policies in the near future. The term LEMA generally refers to this type 
of water management plan, however, in this paper, the term will subsequently 
describe the original Sheridan 6 LEMA as it is the focus of this analysis.  
The Kansas Geological survey maintains and continuously monitors index 
wells in the three western Kansas GMDs to monitor the High Plains aquifer. 
Although it is unclear exactly how much time it takes for water savings to modify 
the depth to water of the aquifer, the recent study by Deines et al. (2019) found 
evidence of stabilizing groundwater levels inside the LEMA compared to outside 
the LEMA.  
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 1.3 Research Overview 
The concentration of this research is to consider impacts from the collective action 
water quantity restriction policy implemented in Sheridan County, Kansas. We use 
Difference-in-Difference estimators to compare changes in irrigation behavior 
inside the policy boundary to behavior in a 5-mile buffer zone outside the policy 
boundary. I estimate the effect of the policy on total water use, irrigated acreage, 
water intensity, cropping patterns and yields. The results give new insights into how 
irrigators adjusted their behavior to adapt to the restriction in the short run. By 
understanding the different margins of adjustment the results also indicate the 
potential effect of water restrictions on other agribusiness industries due to changes 
in agricultural outputs and inputs. I also wanted to consider possible unintended 
consequences from the water management plan and address the concerns of the 
irrigators proposed in the planning process related to disproportionate water 
restrictions.  
Additionally, it is important to note that the Difference-in-Differences 
framework has strict underlying assumptions. It controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity that is constant over time and correlated with the dependent variables 
such that by differencing the data I can remove these time-invariant portions of the 
model. Additionally, it controls for unobserved heterogeneity that is constant across 
individuals and parsed out by a second differencing in the data. However, I believe 
there exists additional variation among farmers that cannot be completely captured 
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by the D-I-D model such that I propose an additional secondary fixed effects 
regression model that controls for differential changes over time by farmer.  
This analysis outlines the methodology for estimating the effects of the policy 
on the LEMA irrigators by beginning with the literature review in Chapter 2 which 
covers Groundwater Policy and Management in the US, previous studies of water 
demand management and decomposed marginal estimates and elasticities as well 
as yield estimation from simulation models and regional specific water budgets.  I 
then outline in Chapter 3 the conceptual model of irrigator water use decisions 
before presenting the data, variables, and model controls in Chapter 4 in addition 
to an explanation of the defined boundary areas. For the purposes of establishing 
our model, it is important to note how the boundary of the LEMA group was 
defined. Chapter 5 explains the fundamentals of the D-I-D model empirical 
methods including the specification of my preferred model, the methodology for 
decomposing marginal effects of water use and specified production function. This 
chapter includes further validation of the methods with explanations of the policy 
event study, dummy corrections, fit of production function and use of robust 
standard errors.  Finally, Chapters 6,7, and 8 cover the results for extensive and 
intensive marginal changes in water use, changes in cropping patterns and input 




Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
Previous studies that address water demand analysis are broad and include topics 
of water pricing, crop production and groundwater sustainability which provide 
valuable background for this study. I begin with a discussion of the general issue 
of long-term groundwater management as it applies to the study area to establish 
the timeliness and need for this research. I then narrow the focus to the literature 
that specifically discusses water user response to price and various demand shifters 
to introduce the void that our estimation of the direct effect from a water quantity 
restriction will fill. Finally, because this study uses an estimation approach that is 
based on a strict set of underlying assumptions I also include a section of literature 
that addresses potential shortcomings and current studies that outline improvements 
to the estimation methodology. 
 2.1 Groundwater Policy and Management 
The issue of appropriate water use management strategies is not just isolated to the 
Ogallala Aquifer. A common theme within all water policy literature is uncertainty 
toward future climate and groundwater depletion rates as agriculture becomes 
increasingly dependent on irrigation technologies. This concern has been long 
withstanding with studies beginning in the early 1970s attempting to evaluate 
which types of policy-induced welfare maximization. In particular, the study by 
Mapp and Eidman (1976) considered a quantity limitation and a graduated tax to 
determine the optimal policy instrument in the central basin of the Ogallala Aquifer. 
While the quantity restriction might be preferable to policy makers due to its ability 
11 
to reduce water-use rates by the largest amount and easier to implement, they found 
that it provided the lowest level of net farm income with the greatest relative 
variability. Historically, many irrigators share these sentiments and have tended to 
be against water restrictive policies.  
An early study modeling regulated pumping costs in the Texas High Plains 
indicated that even in the face of decreased groundwater resources, the costs for 
regulating Texas farmers were too high and concluded that no regulations of 
groundwater withdrawals needed to be taken (Nieswiadomy, 1985). This 
determination was based on the previous study by Gisser and Sanchez (1980) who 
established the Gisser-Sanchez rule. This widely controversial paradox suggests 
that economic benefits from regulating irrigated groundwater use for irrigation are 
negligible if the groundwater storage capacity is relatively large and the demand 
for groundwater is highly inelastic. At the time, further examination of the rule in 
other western states was not plausible due to a lack of farm-level data on irrigated 
users. Furthermore, current studies lend evidence to the contrary indicating 
structured policy regulations are necessary for improved groundwater management.  
In particular, the study by Kim et al. (2015) concluded that the Gisser-Sanchez 
rule is not applicable when irrigation technology is allowed to vary across time. 
Rather than leaving this resource to the tragedy of the commons, the research 
constructs a theoretical justification for developing socially optimal rates of 
groundwater extraction and conclude that there may be considerable scope for 
improving groundwater management, including increased groundwater quantity 
12 
restrictions. Additionally, another recent study by Peterson and Ding (2005) 
presented a dynamic model of Kansas and Colorado examining the expected effects 
of alternative restriction policy scenarios. The research determined that without 
water policy intervention, the saturated thickness of the Ogallala would be reduced 
by more than 50 percent, and most irrigated cropland would revert back to rain-fed 
cropland within 60 years. Furthermore, at the time of his study, Neiswiadomy had 
projected the life of the aquifer beneath the Texas High Plains to have another 40-
50 years before the steady-state solution was reached. This seems short-sighted 
given that 30 years later have passed and the condition of the aquifer continues to 
still be a topic of great concern and research with many stakeholders interested in 
determining sustainable appropriation of the groundwater such that the aquifer 
continues to be a viable resource for future generations.  
Many times, the focus of water policy is on improvements in water-saving 
technology; however, the study by Peterson and Ding (2005) indicate that these 
policies may have adverse effects such that improvements in irrigation efficiency 
could potentially increase total irrigated acres (i.e. whereby increasing total water 
consumption) and is dependent on relationships in the crop production process. A 
more recent study by Pfeiffer and Lin (2014) uses empirical evidence in western 
Kansas to validate Peterson and Ding’s findings, concluding that on average, the 
adoption of more efficient irrigation technology resulted in increased water use 
from changes in crop type. As a result, a need for more empirical evidence at the 
13 
farm level is necessary to model irrigation strategy choice behavior that includes 
variables relating to weather, crop and soil characteristics.  
Hornbeck and Keskin (2014) studied how agricultural production decisions 
changed from the introduction of irrigation over the Ogallala Aquifer. They 
considered impacts from drought and concluded irrigated land use adjusted toward 
water-intensive crops, whereas, irrigators in nearby water-scarce areas maintained 
lower value drought-resistant cropping patterns that naturally reduce water quantity 
sensitivity. While the study presented by Peterson and Ding (2005) provides a 
scenario framework for the consideration of water restrictive policies, the current 
empirical studies on water policy effects neglect to evaluate irrigated user’s 
decisions from a water use restriction with the exception of Hornbeck and Keskin 
(2014) who quantified effects by comparing counties over the Ogallala with nearby 
similar counties while controlling for average differences in soil characteristics and 
weather. Smith et al. (2017) used a Difference-in-Differences model and found that 
a self-imposed groundwater pumping fee in Colorado was effective at reducing 
water use.  Additionally,  a study by Deines et. al. (2019) evaluated the marginal 
effects on irrigators inside the Sheridan 6 Local Enhanced Management Area 
(LEMA) using a Bayesian structural time series approach.  This approach uses a 
counterfactual control group as the basis for comparison to identify the causal effect 
of the policy. I will provide an alternative framework and attempt to simplify the 
model presented by Hornbeck and Keskin (2014) and exploit field-level fixed 
effects through a Difference-in-Differences model similar in approach to Smith et 
14 
al. (2017) to identify the causal effect of the LEMA. LEMAs are not tied to county 
boundaries but rather to areas identified with critical concerns, therefore, it is 
necessary to describe these policy restriction areas at the field level. 
 2.2 Water Demand 
Currently in the US, as in many other countries, producers obtain a water right to 
pump groundwater for irrigation. Economists argue that regional markets for these 
water rights would lead to more efficient use of water and could offset short-run 
losses due to quantity restrictions resulting in improvements to sustainability of the 
resources (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Howe et al., 1986; Hearne and Easter, 
1995; Easter and Hearne., 1995; Jr. and Howitt, 1984). In Kansas, as in many other 
western states, water rights are based on prior appropriation which establishes a 
hierarchy based on seniority of the water right. In general, economists argue that 
this misallocates water resources and can cause inefficiencies, for which, water 
markets seek to correct. With the increased attention on water markets, a large 
portion of the policy literature that addresses irrigated users is dedicated to the 
effects of water pricing variation to directly evaluate the impact of a water tax while 
modeling crop irrigation/production functions and willingness to pay/water rents. 
(Green et al., 1996; Iglesias and Blanco, 2008; Scheierling et al., 2006; Varela-
Ortega et al., 1998; Gómez-Limón et al., 2002; Gómez-Limón and Riesgo, 2004).  
The work conducted by Varela-Ortega et al. (1998) estimating the differences 
in water demand observed in three different water basins was explained by the 
structural parameters including crop variety, irrigation technology, farm size, and 
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productivity capacity. The study determined different price effects on irrigation 
water demand, farmers’ income, and government revenues while evaluating the 
changing irrigator strategies on irrigation technology, water management, cropping 
patterns and land use. The authors indicate that although water pricing policies are 
regional specific with respect to water conservation strategies and policies have to 
be carefully defined in each region, the different pricing policies produce 
remarkably uniform effects across regions and water districts such that the ordering 
of the effects on water demand and revenue loss is maintained across regions and 
water management districts. Furthermore, to address future water management 
policies Iglesias and Blanco (2008) proposed a model to evaluate different pricing 
effects on water demand, environmental indicators, cropping patterns, technology 
adoption, labor, farmers’ income, and government revenues.  
There have additionally been other noteworthy studies quantifying important 
water pricing policy effects evaluating water pricing effects or quantity regulations 
on the share of water resources and estimation of the “value” of water (Johansson 
et al., 2002); nonetheless, the current literature is void of studies defining direct 
policy effects on specific crop production decisions. The policy effects that this 
study seeks to estimate include irrigation user’s decisions on irrigation technology 
in the face of a more restricted water use right. To explain irrigation technology 
choices a study by Green et al. (1996) demonstrated that water price is not the most 
important factor when producers are making choices on irrigation system strategy. 
In fact, they find that factors relating to the physical characteristics of crop 
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production including weather, crop and soil characteristics are more important and 
conclude for the need to use farm-level data to determine the effects on irrigation 
technology choices. 
 2.3 Decomposed Marginal Estimates and Elasticities 
The studies conducted by Moore et al. (1994) and Schoengold et al. (2006) 
decompose the water demand estimates into extensive and intensive marginal 
effects. Although they find the majority of the response occurring at the extensive 
margin (defined as changes to cropping patterns) they indicate that if most of the 
price response is at the intensive margin (defined as applied water use), then 
policies that target irrigation intensity or water-saving technologies will be more 
cost-effective. While the study conducted by Moore et al. estimated crop type, 
supply, water demand, and land allocation functions for field crops the study by 
Schoengold et al. (2006) was more narrowly focused on output and irrigation 
strategy additionally suggesting the majority of the response occurring due to 
changes in crop type.  
More recently, Hendricks and Peterson (2012) estimated irrigation water 
demand over the Kansas portion of the Ogallala Aquifer in which they further 
decompose the water demand estimates into an extensive (changes in irrigated 
acreage), direct intensive (changes in applied water use), and indirect intensive 
(changes in crop type) margins finding alternatively the majority of the response at 
the intensive margin due to changes in applied water/acre. They additionally 
introduce a framework and argument to establish that the fixed effects estimates are 
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unbiased and consistent for the policy variable of interest even though the estimates 
for the independent variables are not. 
The management of water resources can be difficult because official resource, 
economic and production data are often available at various non-comparable scales 
(Mallawaarachchi et al., 1996). In the water demand study conducted by Hendricks 
and Peterson (2012) they found few water management studies utilizing micro data, 
or data beyond the county level, with the exception of Moore et al. (1994); 
Schoengold et al. (2006). The goal of this research is to provide estimates of 
irrigator responses under the LEMA policy and compare to nearby irrigators met 
with the same weather and political conditions to uncover the decomposed marginal 
effects from the policy on farmer’s choice behavior such that I evaluate the need 
for farmer-specific and field-specific variables while loosely modeling this study in 
the spirit of Hornbeck and Keskin (2014). 
 2.4 Marginal Effects of Crop Yield Estimation 
Previous studies that consider the effects of water use on yields are widely centered 
around deficit irrigation strategies, crop production, and water pricing policy. 
Although deficit irrigation is in effect a method to reduce water quantities it does 
not specifically speak to a water quantity restriction. Studies are extremely limited 
that consider the impacts of a water quantity restriction policy on subsequent 
irrigator yields.  
Additionally, due to increasing drought management, climate variability, and 
groundwater sustainability, it is important to consider research on outcomes from 
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other water saving policies and the effectiveness of different yield simulation 
models. For this reason, I consider the following two sections which speak to water 
policy and the comparison of different simulated models. 
In Kansas, Golden and Leatherman (2011) produced more recently a study 
considering groundwater demand and revenue loss effects on crop production by 
comparing before and after trends of the Walnut Creek IGUCA in an effort to 
evaluate how a more sustainable water management policy might affect producer’s 
profits. They concluded that the localized policy resulted in significant reductions 
in total area groundwater use, a positive effect on the life of the aquifer, but 
insignificant long run effects on annual irrigated crop revenues. 
 2.5 Crop Yield Simulation Models 
There are many spatial yield models that are used for predicting yields of various 
agricultural crops including CropSys, AquaCrop, and YieldStat. These models 
employ various non-linear regression approaches utilizing databases that are well-
informed on nutrient loads of different crops. These models, however, are not 
regional specific and for the purposes of this study which is done at the micro level, 
I argue that the Kansas Water Budgets are better suited because they have been 
validated with actual data from the policy area. 
 The Kansas Water Budget (KSWB) was developed as a yield predictor for 
both rain-fed and irrigated crops in western Kansas (Stone et al. 1995, 2006; Klocke 
et al. 2010; Khan et al. 1996). It is the basis for two irrigation management tools; 
the Crop Yield Predictor (CYP) and the Crop Water Allocator (CWA) provided by 
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extension from Kansas State University for which we use as a comparison to the 
remotely sensed data. Many studies have validated the use of the KSWB including 
the study by Klocke et al. (2010) which compared the KSWB results with four years 
of field research plot data. In contrast to other models, such as the CERES, it relies 
on inputs of daily maximum and minimum air temperature, crop coefficients, soil 
water stress coefficients; and plant water stress coefficients to calculate effective 
ETe which is related to yield by a locally calibrated yield-ETe relationship. The 
study also provides a nice graphical representation of how the KSWB predicts 
yields.  
 Irrigation needs to be allocated among crops, using crop production 
functions and production costs for optimum economic return Klocke et al. (2010). 
The Crop Yield Predictor University (b) (CYP) and the Crop Water Allocator 
University (a) (CWA) were designed as an interactive decision tool to predict crop 
yields and economic returns for deficit irrigated crops and made available by 
Kansas State University’s Mobile Irrigation Lab. Both the CYP and the CWA use 
the Kansas Water Budget (KSWB) simulation model to predict crop yields, ETr, 
ETc, and daily ASW (Klocke et al. 2010; Stone et al. 1995, 2006; Khan et al. 1996).  
The KSWB was designed to use average daily values from 30 years of weather 
data (maximum and minimum air temperature, solar radiation, and precipitation) 
for each location to calculate ETr, ETc, daily ASW, and crop yields. Klocke et al. 
(2010) described the technical background and operation of the KSWB and 
furthermore compared the results from KSWB simulations with data from a field 
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study conducted at Garden City, Kansas during 2005 through 2008. The KSWB 
was executed with daily weather data and irrigation events from the field study. 
They showed that: (1) actual field and KSWB yield-ET relationships were almost 
identical; (2) soil water contents from field data compared well with KSWB results; 
and (3) KSWB tended to underestimate crop yields relative to fully irrigated yields 
and ETc as irrigation declined. These differences were attributed to calibrations of 
the KSWB with historical data from conventional (tilled) management but the field 
study was managed with no-till techniques.  
CYP users can designate potential irrigation schedules to optimize yields and 
net returns. These schedules can be tested for a range of annual precipitation to find 
yield and income risks from several input scenarios including wet, average, and dry 
years; different dates and amounts of irrigation events; inclusion or exclusion of 
pre-season irrigation (Stone et al. 1987); different soil types; different irrigation 
system application efficiencies; or different soil water contents before or during the 
growing season. The Crop Yield Predictor (CYP) and the Crop Water Allocator 
(CWA) tools derived from the underlying KSWB model can calculate crop-specific 
yields by combining the effects of weather parameters, crop development during 
the growing season, water stress from soil water availability, and the crop’s 
susceptibility to stress during four growth periods as described by Klocke et al. 
(2010).  
The functions of interest for this study that are contained in the KSWB are as 
follows: 
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𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 =  0.078 +  0.0252(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸)(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅) 2.493 − 0.00214(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸) 
where  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = reference ET (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚)  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸 = average daily temperature (𝐶𝐶)  
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = average daily solar radiation (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑚𝑚 − 2). 
The maximum evapotranspiration (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚) and actual evapotranspiration 
(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) calculations are as follows: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚 =  𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 =  𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚 
=  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 +  1) 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(101)  ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚 
where  
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 = crop coefficients  
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 = soil water stress coefficients  
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = available soil water content (%). 
A daily drainage function (𝑅𝑅), specific to Ulysses silt loam soil, is given by Stone 
et al. (1987) and described as a function of total soil water content (TSW) measured 
in 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚.  





  . 
Additionally, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 was adjusted daily using a water balanced equation of total soil 
water to a depth of 1.8 𝑚𝑚 (𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡) and was represented as:  
𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡  =  𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑦𝑦  +  𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦 +  𝐼𝐼𝑦𝑦  − 𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦  − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑦𝑦 
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where  
𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑦𝑦  = total soil water at the beginning of yesterday  
𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦  = the precipitation that entered the soil yesterday  
𝐼𝐼𝑦𝑦  = the irrigation that entered the soil yesterday  
𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦  = the water that drained out of the soil yesterday  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑦𝑦  = the water extracted out of the soil yesterday. 
Finally, the effective ET (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 ∗) is calculated from the ratio of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 to 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚 with 
crop specific weights (𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔) that account for water stress during the growing season 
and is as follows:  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 ∗ = ��
�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚� ∗𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔
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� 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚  
This is combined with the Yield-ET equations to represent crop specific yields 
(𝑌𝑌𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑌) as: 
𝑌𝑌 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 =  𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 ∗) − 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  
Or more specifically, they use the linear functions presented by Klocke et al. (2010) 
to estimate yields for corn and soybean 𝑌𝑌 [𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙 ℎ𝐸𝐸−1] as a function of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚) 
such that the crop-specific yield function is as follows: 
𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  =  0.042(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 ∗) − 12.33, 




Chapter 3 - Conceptual Model of Irrigator Water Use 
Decisions 
I conceptually model the effect of the LEMA policy on total acres irrigated, acreage 
planted to different crops, and irrigation intensity as different margins of adjustment 
similar to the study conducted by Hendricks and Peterson (2012). Here I apply the 
same methodology to responses from a water quantity restriction from the Sheridan 
6 LEMA. I decompose the effect of the quantity restriction into the following three 
direct and indirect margins of adjustment: (i) extensive (irrigated acreage), (ii) 
indirect intensive (changes in crop allocation), and (iii) direct intensive (changes in 
irrigation intensity for a given crop). My decomposition follows the same 
methodology as used in the water demand literature that examines the margins of 
adjustment to changes in price (Moore et al., 1994; Schoengold et al., 2006; 
Hendricks and Peterson, 2012).  
Assume we have a representative irrigator such that their water demand for a 
particular well is subject to a water quota denoted q. I identify a particular land use 
as the varying combination of crop type and irrigation technology and represented 
as 𝑗𝑗 =  1, . . . , 𝑀𝑀 land uses. Let irrigators choose 𝐸𝐸(𝑞𝑞) the optimal irrigated acreage, 
and let 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗(𝑞𝑞) indicate the optimal applied water intensity in acre inches/acre for 
each of the 𝑗𝑗 land uses. Let 𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗(𝑞𝑞) represent the optimal share of irrigated acreage 






Here I am only interested in modeling water demand as a function of the LEMA 
water quota restriction. I represent total water use at the field level as a function of 
the total quantity of irrigated water and written as a function of average applied 
water per acre multiplied by the number of acres irrigated: 
𝑅𝑅(𝑞𝑞)  =  𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞)𝐸𝐸(𝑞𝑞) 
I can then differentiate the above equation and multiply by 𝑞𝑞 ⁄ (𝑅𝑅(𝑞𝑞)) to give the 
extensive marginal effects such that I can quantify the change in irrigated acres 
µ𝑠𝑠(𝑞𝑞) and the total intensive marginal effect, the change in irrigation intensity µ𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞) 











or more simply 
µ𝐷𝐷(𝑞𝑞) =  µ𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞) +  µ𝑠𝑠(𝑞𝑞) 
Additionally, I can find from decomposition of the average applied water per acre 
function 𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞) the direct and indirect intensive marginal effects or the changes in 
crop allocation due to a change in the water quota of the LEMA. Differentiating 
𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞) and multiply by 𝑞𝑞 ⁄ (𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞)) such that:  











µ 𝑤𝑤(𝑞𝑞) =  µ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 +  µ 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠. 
Here I find the total intensive margin is made up of two effects 𝜇𝜇𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 which can be 
described as the direct intensive marginal effect and  𝜇𝜇𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠  defined as the indirect 
intensive marginal effect. The indirect marginal effect represents the change in 
water intensity because farmers switched to less water-intensive crops. The direct 
intensive effect represents changes in water intensity due to less water application 
per acre while holding constant the cropping pattern. 
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Chapter 4 - Data 
This analysis merges various spatial data sets to create an unbalanced 
panel data set for irrigated farms in northwest Kansas across a 6 year period 
(2009-2014) to describe the effects on farmers’ decisions and subsequent 
production yields from the LEMA. Because LEMAs are not tied to county 
boundaries but rather to areas identified with critical concerns, it is important to 
construct the data set at a micro level instead of county-level aggregates.  
 4.1 Water Use and Agricultural Variables 
Kansas law requires all water right holders to report annually on irrigation and crop 
characteristics (Hendricks and Peterson, 2012). Because of this, I am able to 
quantify reported water use data at each irrigator’s water well (termed a “point of 
diversion”). Each water right holder is assigned a water right id number which is 
attached to a specific point of diversion and a specific place of use, however, this 
does not necessarily mean that the water right is exclusive to just one point of 
diversion. Because the water use restriction is placed on the water right itself, I 
aggregate the linkages to identify the variables in the model for water withdrawal, 
crop type and irrigation system to the water right level from the Kansas Water 
Rights Information System Database (WRIS). These observations were then 
identified spatially according to the location of the points of diversion associated 
with each water right.  
The specific crops considered in this analysis include alfalfa, corn, sorghum, 
soybeans, and wheat with two additional categories identified as multiple and other. 
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Although there were many crops grown inside the LEMA, there are relatively few 
water rights that are specifically dedicated to one crop other than corn, therefore, 
we can only predict yields for single crops where the entire water use is dedicated 
to the water right.  
The category for other irrigated uses includes fruits, vegetables, sunflowers, 
golf courses, pasture, cotton, athletic fields, turf grass, barley, oats, rye, and dry 
beans. Additionally, some reporting merely indicates that “multiple” crops were 
grown, but not which crops were specifically grown. The Kansas data does not 
indicate the number of acres planted to each crop nor how the irrigated water was 
distributed to each crop when multiple crop types were reported. I, therefore, follow 
the methodology of Hendricks and Peterson (2012) to identify that if 𝑘𝑘 crops were 
grown, the proportion of the field in each crop is simply 1/𝑘𝑘. The irrigation 
technologies in this analysis include flood, drip, center pivot, center pivot with low 
drop nozzles, and other sprinkler types. 
 4.2 Weather Controls 
Additional site specific variables were obtained to describe yields as a function of 
water use intensity at each point of diversion. This accounts for site specific yield-
ET relationships across farmers within the LEMA boundaries to be computed and 
compared to farmers outside the boundary based on net irrigation. Because 
irrigation decisions rely heavily on weather conditions I include a set of weather 
controls in the model obtained from the PRISM Climate group (PRISM). The 
PRISM data are a 4 kilometer interpolated grid and have been shown to be an 
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accurate representation of US climate. Because the LEMA is approximately 99 
square miles (160 square kilometers) this data provides variability between the 
LEMA and control groups. Additionally, I include annual precipitation and 
reference evapotranspiration (ET) to account for changes in water demand due to 
weather. 
  4.3 Construction of the Boundaries 
The points of diversion inside the LEMA boundary and points of diversion in a 5 
mile buffer outside the LEMA boundary are represented as the 2 groups of irrigators 
for comparison. Wells under the LEMA quantity restriction were identified from 
official Kansas Department of Agriculture data. The 5 mile buffer zone surrounding 
the LEMA acting as the control group was then used as the counterfactual group as 
the basis for a Difference-In-Differences (D-I-D) fixed effect model to evaluate the 
causal effect on yields from farmers being subject to the LEMA (Figure 4). These 
boundaries allow us to assess whether yields for the LEMA group would have been 
the same to the 5 mile group, had the LEMA policy not been in place which is the 
fundamental assumption of the D-I-D model. Consideration was additionally given 











Note: The red area indicates wells within the LEMA Policy Area and the blue area indicate wells 
located in the control group (i.e., 5 Mile buffer area). 
 





 4.4 Summary Statistics 
This study contains 2819 observations of which 1889 are before the LEMA went 
into effect. Of those 1889 observations, there were 1175 observations in the 5mile 
control group and 714 observations in the LEMA treatment group. Following Villa 
(2012) I use a balancing t-test of the difference in the means of both the dependent 
variables and covariates between the 5 mile irrigators and the LEMA irrigators in 
period 𝑡𝑡 =  0 based on the kernel weight (Table 1).  
None of the estimates on the independent variables indicate a significant 
difference from each other such that I can identify that there are no pre-policy 
differences between the two groups. However, I do find significant estimates 
indicating pre-policy differences in some of the dependent variables suggesting the 
necessity of the D-I-D framework. I find most LEMA irrigators using a center pivot 
with low drop nozzles (0.870) followed by a traditional pivot (0.059) or pivot and 
flood combination system (0.053). Additionally, we can see in this table that most 
irrigated acreage is dedicated to corn (0.683), with additional land use spread 
between soybean (0.182), wheat (0.22), sorghum (0.002) and alfalfa (0.013) with 
the remaining 10% dedicated to other crops (0.008) or multi-crop (0.088) where the 
exact combination of crop types is unknown. Additionally, I find annual 




Table 1:  Summary Statistics of the LEMA Irrigator Group Compared to the 
5 Mile Control Group 
 
 Variable Mean 5 Mile (control) Mean LEMA (treated) Difference 
log Acres Irrigated   4.888   4.887  -0.001 
log Applied Inches   7.351   7.434  -0.001** 
log Intensity   2.463   2.547   0.084** 
    
Irrigation System    
Flood   0.005   0.004  -0.001 
Drip   0.000   0.000   0.000 
Traditional Pivot   0.052   0.059   0.006 
Pivot with low drop   0.889   0.870  -0.019 
Sprinkler   0.003   0.004   0.001 
Pivot and Flood   0.043   0.053   0.010 
Drip Other   0.005   0.006   0.000 
All Other Irr   0.002   0.004   0.003 
    
Cropping Type    
Alfalfa   0.010   0.013   0.002 
Corn   0.690   0.683  -0.008 
Sorghum   0.003   0.002  -0.000 
Soybean   0.188   0.182  -0.006 
Wheat   0.021   0.022   0.001 
Other Crops   0.009   0.008   0.013 
Multiple Unknown   0.076   0.088  -0.068 
    
Weather    
Precipitation 
 
21.741 21.674  -0.068 
Evapotranspiration 41.096 41.084  -0.012 
 
 4.5 Yield Data 
Since I do not have data on actual yields in each field, I generate predicted yields 
for a given amount of precipitation and irrigation from output created by the 
KSWB. Although many irrigators maintain rotating crops or have a mix of crops 
for a single water right, we only want to predict yield estimates for crops where a 
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single crop was planted to the entire water right. In these cases, we know that all 
the water applied went to the same crop type and can accurately be modeled. 
Because of the nature of the policy and crops grown in the area there were only 
enough observations to predict corn and soybean yields. I represent the crop yield 
as a nonlinear function of net irrigation and precipitation such that: 
𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸2  + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌 + 
𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌2  + 𝛽𝛽4 ∗ (𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌). 
Using the data for yield simulations reported in Stone et al., (1995) we generate the 
necessary coefficients for the nonlinear function of irrigation and precipitation 
variables in the non-linear model to generate the predicted values of yields to use 
in the model.  
Table 2: Predictive Model of Irrigation and Precipitation for Yield Estimates 
 
Cropping Type Corn Soybean 
Variable/Statistic   
Const -182.92**  -55.24** 
 (12.57) (2.75) 
Irr 25.56** 8.19** 
 (0.374) (0.089) 
Irr2 -0.43** -0.13** 
 (0.009) (0.002) 
Precip 12.60** 4.13** 
 (1.557) (0.341) 
Precip2 -0.05 -0.02 
 (0.048) (0.011) 
Irr*Precip -0.43** -0.15** 
 (0.019) (0.004) 
N 275 253 
R2 0.9893 0.9951 
Note: The dependent variable is given by the column heading. Parentheses denote robust clustered (water 
right level) std. errors. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels. Farmer-Time specific estimates 
were removed for conciseness. LEMA effect estimates adjusted for log-linear correction only. 
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Figures 3 and 4 shows a visual plot of the fitted values of the specified yield 
functions for Corn and Soybean, respectively, to the Stone data to identify how well 
the function fits the original data. Note that there are eleven separate fitted lines 
shown for different values of precipitation such that I model a range (11 to 21 
inches) of possible precipitation scenarios. We can see that there is a nonlinear 
relationship between the fitted values and the intensity. In general, we can see that 
the yield estimates increase as an irrigator’s water use intensity increases, however, 
the they do so at a declining rate such that excessive water use intensity results in 
loss of yields. This intuitively makes sense. Overall, the estimated functions fit the 
data very well as can be seen visually, and also apparent from the 𝑅𝑅2 values of 
0.989 and 0.995. 
 I then use the yield functions in table 2 to predict the yield for every water 
right planted completely to either corn or soybeans. I assume that the net irrigation 
is 90% of the total water applied to account for some evapotransiration and system 
loss since I do not know actual losses. We use these predicted yields from these 




Figure 3: Fit of Corn Yield Model of Net Irrigation at Various Levels of 
Precipitation 
 




Chapter 5 - Empirical Methods 
 5.1 Difference-In-Differences 
The Difference-In-Differences estimator allows us to model the unobserved 
variability across both irrigators and time that is constant. This is shown graphically 
in the following Figures 5, 6 and 7.  
Consider just the difference in behavior of the LEMA irrigators average post-
policy compared to a pre-policy average response of the same (Case 1: Figure 5). 
Here I exploit only the change of water use decisions and effects on yields before 
and after the LEMA policy went into effect to capture the irrigator fixed effect, 
however, it doesn’t account for changes across time such as weather. 
 
Figure 5: Case 1: Before and After Comparison 
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Now consider rather just the difference in behavior of the LEMA irrigators in 
post-policy compared to other nearby irrigators located in a 5 mile radius 
surrounding the LEMA (Case 2: Figure 6). This exploits the change in water use 
decisions and effects on yields of LEMA irrigators compared to Non-LEMA 
irrigators and captures the time fixed effect, however, this does not capture any 
variability that is specific to just the LEMA irrigators. That is, is there something 
different about the irrigators themselves that may cause them to naturally use more 
or less water than other irrigators?  
 






If I combine the above two scenarios I can effectively model not only how 
LEMA irrigators changed their behavior pre/post policy but also how that change 
is different from the change that occurred in another non-LEMA group (Case 3: 
Figure 7). Essentially I can parse out common effects to both groups to isolate the 
specific effect of the LEMA policy on the LEMA irrigators by isolating both a time 
fixed effect as well as an irrigator fixed effect. 
 
Figure 7: Case 3: Difference-In-Differences 
 
I use D-I-D to evaluate the difference of the short-run effect of the LEMA on 
farmers’ water use behavior and production such that I control for unobserved 
heterogeneity of water rights that are constant over time and unobserved 
heterogeneity of each year that are constant across fields.  
38 
Consider the on-farm water use decisions (𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) made by an irrigator 𝑃𝑃 for a 
particular water right associated with a particular well location where in the absence 
of the LEMA, the irrigator’s on-farm decisions are determined by the sum of a time-
invariant water right effect (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) and a yearly effect captured by (𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡) that is common 
across all fields. The dependent variables for each irrigator include (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)) log 
acres irrigated, (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)) log of water intensity, (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)) log of yields dedicated 
to a single crop, and proportion planted to each (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) crop type. I represent the 
potential outcome of not being subject to the LEMA, (i.e. the untreated group) as 
an expectation that is assumed to be constant over time: 
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡|𝑙𝑙, 𝑃𝑃, 𝑡𝑡]  =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  +  𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 
where Y is the outcome variable of interest, 𝑙𝑙 =  1 assigns irrigators to the LEMA, 
and 𝑡𝑡 indicates years from 2009-2014 such that years can be categorized as either 
pre-policy or post-policy. Let the dummy variable (𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡)  =  1 if the irrigator is 
inside the LEMA boundary after the LEMA restrictions were implemented (i.e., 
2013-2014). I incorporate the effect of the policy into the empirical model as 
follows: 
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡|𝑙𝑙, 𝑃𝑃, 𝑡𝑡]  =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  +  𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 
The treatment effect of being subject to the LEMA is just the difference of the 
above two equations representing the parameter β defined as follows: 
𝛽𝛽 =  𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  − 𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡].  
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I can represent the D-I-D using 2 time periods of data, that is before and after 
the LEMA, as the conditional expectation function such that the difference for the 
LEMA group pre and post-treatment are as follows: 
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 |𝑙𝑙 =  1, 𝑡𝑡 =  𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 |𝑙𝑙 =  1, 𝑡𝑡 =  𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸]  =  𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡  − 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠  +  𝛽𝛽. 
Similarly, I can represent the difference for the control group, those irrigators 
located just five miles outside the LEMA boundary as the following conditional 
expectation function: 
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 |𝑙𝑙 =  0, 𝑡𝑡 =  𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 |𝑙𝑙 =  0, 𝑡𝑡 =  𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸]  =  𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡  − 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 . 
The aggregate causal effect of interest (𝛽𝛽) can be obtained by taking the difference 
in the differences as follows: 
{𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 |𝑙𝑙 =  1, 𝑡𝑡 =  𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 |𝑙𝑙 =  1, 𝑡𝑡 =  𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸]}
− {𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 |𝑙𝑙 =  0, 𝑡𝑡 =  𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 |𝑙𝑙 =  0, 𝑡𝑡 =  𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸]} =  𝛽𝛽. 
I will show D-I-D results for the key outcomes of interest using aggregate 
(average) data across the water rights inside the LEMA boundary and the 5-mile 
buffer. I consider these aggregate results as useful descriptive results, however, 
because of the restrictive assumptions of the D-I-D it is important to explore other 
variability in an expanded fixed effects model that allows for changes across time 
and space simultaneously.  
The D-I-D model isolates changes across time that are constant in space, and 
changes in space that are constant in time. In order for our D-I-D model to be 
correctly specified, there must no systematic differences among our irrigators in our 
treatment group from the irrigators in our control group. That is, I assume that both 
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groups follow a parallel path such that when something changes in one group it also 
changes in the other simultaneously. This assumption allows isolation of any 
differences in the trends as being a causal effect due to the treatment. However, it 
is important to note that this assumption hinges on having no systematic differences 
among the groups of irrigators due to other non-LEMA effects. 
 5.2 Preferred Fixed Effects Model 
I argue that although the D-I-D framework is useful to identify general outcomes 
of the LEMA policy, it is important to account for the differences of each farmer in 
each year in order to accurately measure the causal estimate. For this, I identify the 
following less restrictive fixed effects model such that I control for unobserved 
heterogeneity of water rights that are constant over time, unobserved heterogeneity 
of each year that are constant across water rights, and unobserved heterogeneity of 
farmers that varies across years. Because the D-I-D isolates the difference as being 
due to the LEMA, I relax the assumption to allow for isolation of other non-LEMA 
differences among irrigators.  
The dependent decision variables for each irrigator now represented as the 
potential outcome of not being subject to the LEMA, includes a farmer-time effect 
(𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡) and a vector (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) of weather controls such that our previous time fixed effect 
𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 is now captured in 𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡: 
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡|𝑙𝑙, 𝑃𝑃,𝑓𝑓, 𝑡𝑡]  =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡  +  𝜆𝜆 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 +  𝜃𝜃𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
Note that I can still isolate the effect of the LEMA water policy (𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡) while 
introducing the farmer-time fixed effects because some farmers manage water 
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rights inside the LEMA boundary and in the 5-mile buffer. Intuitively, my 
econometric model exploits behavior changes of farmers who manage water rights 
both inside and outside the LEMA such that their irrigation behavior for water 
rights inside the policy boundary were different than water rights just outside the 
boundary.  
An important consideration of this research is on the underlying assumptions 
of our model. It is important to consider possible sources of selection bias or 
misspecification in the model. Selection bias can be in many forms such that the 
selection of individuals contained within a specified group are not selected 
randomly and prohibits inference of a causal policy effect and the measures of 
marginal effects would be biased.  
For example, if farmers in the LEMA sample group chose to be in the LEMA, 
then we know that they could potentially differ systematically from farmers who 
did not choose to be in the LEMA and might respond to the policy differently. In 
order to address this concern, I want to validate that the fields inside the LEMA 
boundary are not systematically different from those outside the boundary and that 
the control group is not systematically different from another possible control. This 
can be done by comparing pre-treatment trends of both groups, specifically to 
identify that our counterfactual argument, that irrigators would have acted in the 
same way as our control group, is substantiated. I will compare the control group 
to an additional spatially identified 10 Mile group to establish the validity of the 5 
mile control and uncover any possible issues related to selection bias. 
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In addition, I will test the need for additional explanatory covariates including 
weather and irrigator trends. It is important to correctly specify the model such that 
I can be confident in my interpretations of the causal effect of interest from the 
LEMA policy and to establish that the model is free from endogeneity issues and 
not misspecified. 
 5.3 Decomposing the Marginal Effects of Water Use  
I obtain estimates of the total extensive margin estimates (βa) and the total intensive 
margin estimates (βw) directly from the following log-form regressions for the 
effects on irrigated acres 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡) and intensity of applied water per acre 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡): 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)  =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 +  𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  +  𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 (1) 
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)  =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽𝑤𝑤𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 +  𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  +  𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 (2) 
where 
 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is a water right fixed effect 
 𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 is a farmer-time fixed effect 
 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 is a vector of precipitation and evapotranspiration variables  
However, I assume that heterogeneity of soils and hydrological variables are 
constant across time such that they will be captured in the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖.  So that, I can simply 
characterize the direct intensive marginal effect in response to the policy, in 
estimates form, as 𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦 and the total effect on water use in response to the policy is 
simply the sum both margins, our estimates obtained from equations (1) and (2). 
?̂?𝛽𝑠𝑠 +  ?̂?𝛽𝑤𝑤  =  ?̂?𝛽 
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I characterize the intensive margin of water use as having both a direct and 
indirect effect. I estimate the direct intensive margin by holding land use constant 
in our regression. Denote 𝑺𝑺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 as a vector of variables indicating the share of irrigated 
acreage for each land use where land use includes the combination of crop and 
irrigation technology. The direct intensive margin of water use is estimated from 
the following regression: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡� =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 +  𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  +  𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 +  𝜌𝜌𝑺𝑺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 . (3) 
Hendricks and Peterson (2012) show that we can recover the indirect intensive 
margin as simply the difference between the total intensive margin and the indirect 
intensive margin. 
?̂?𝛽𝑤𝑤 +  ?̂?𝛽𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤  =  ?̂?𝛽𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠 
 
 5.4 Estimating the Effect on Crop Yields 
Additionally, utilizing the same framework I can further obtain estimates of the 
total effect on yields (𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦) directly from the following log-form regression. 
          𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)  =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 +  𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡  +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
 
 
 5.5 Event Study 
Conceptually, an event study examines how the effect of the policy varied across 
different years rather than just a 2 period (pre and post) aggregate to uncover the 
variability of each year. It applies the same strict assumptions that decisions among 
water right holders in the LEMA would be expected to be the same as water right 
holders in the 5 mile control group if the water policy had not been implemented 
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(i.e. the counterfactual scenario) such that the water use decisions in a given year 
represent the difference between the observed behavior (𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡) in that year and the 
observed behavior of the control group (𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡).  
I consider the impact of the LEMA policy event on the total extensive (i.e. 
changes in irrigated acres) and total intensive (i.e. changes in applied water 
intensity) margins. I represent the effects on the log-linear prediction of the total 
extensive marginal 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡), total intensive marginal 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡),  and direct intensive 
estimates in the following regressions such that I can separate the effects of each 
year on the linear predictions graphically. 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡� =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  + � 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚
2014
𝑚𝑚=2010
+  𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  +  𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
(4) 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡� =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  + � 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚
2014
𝑚𝑚=2010
+  𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  +  𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
(5) 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡� =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  + � 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚
2014
𝑚𝑚=2010
+  𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  +  𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 +  𝜌𝜌𝑺𝑺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 . 
(6) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 =  1 if the LEMA restriction was applied to the water right and 𝑡𝑡 =  𝑚𝑚. 
Therefore, the estimate for 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚 indicates how water use changed for water rights 
inside the boundary compared to the change in the 5-mile buffer in year m compared 
to a baseline year in 2009. 
 5.6 Dummy Correction for Log-Linear Models 
In his paper, Giles (2011) describes some of the errors that can arise if we 
improperly interpret our coefficient on the treatment dummy variable. He identifies 
45 
the particular post-transformation that must be applied in order to accurately 
interpret the coefficient of a continuous regressor in a regression model, where the 
dependent variable has been log-transformed as follows: 
𝑅𝑅′𝑖𝑖 =  [𝐸𝐸 𝛽𝛽 − 1]  
where 𝛽𝛽 is the coefficient for the LEMA policy effect if our causal effect switches 
from 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 0 to 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 1. I include this correction on the subsequent estimates unless 
otherwise specified. 
 5.7 Robust Clustered Standard Errors 
I additionally consider my assumptions of the model, the estimates, and the 
standard deviation of the underlying errors. I evaluate the use of the following three 









𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅 = (𝑋𝑋′𝑋𝑋)−1  � (𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)′(𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
� ∗ (𝑋𝑋′𝑋𝑋)−1 
(8) 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶 = (𝑋𝑋′𝑋𝑋)−1  � (𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐)′(𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐)
𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐=1
� ∗ (𝑋𝑋′𝑋𝑋)−1 
(9) 
 
where 𝑋𝑋 is a 𝑚𝑚 𝑥𝑥 𝑙𝑙 matrix, 𝑃𝑃 is the residual for the ith observation and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 is a row 
vector of predictors including the constant. The formula for the clustered estimator 
is simply that of the robust (unclustered) estimator with the individual 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 replaced 
by their sum of squares over each cluster.  
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I assume that there exist well-specific characteristics that might carry across 
time. Something fundamentally different about the well itself that would cause 
water use to be impacted, this could include impacts from the user, or impacts from 
the underlying physical structure of the well, pumping mechanism and hydrology. 
I can account for this through the use of robust clustered standard errors at the water 
right level such that I assume independence between water rights, but allow for 
correlation over time. 
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Chapter 6 - Results: Extensive and Intensive Marginal 
Changes in Water Use 
 6.1 D-I-D Model and Visual Analysis 
Using the D-I-D framework we can use the aggregated data to estimate the before 
and after average difference inside the LEMA and compare to the before and after 
average difference in the 5 mile buffer zone outside the LEMA to quantify how 
irrigators under the LEMA responded in quantity of irrigated acreage for each crop 
planted compared to irrigators located within the 5 mile boundary. Figure 8 shows 
the graphical results for total acres irrigated (extensive margin) and Figure 9 
indicates the effect on water use intensity (intensive margin). I find that irrigators 
in the 5 mile boundary increased applied intensity slightly, however, if I assume 
that the same trend would have occurred inside the LEMA in the absence of the 
restriction then this implies that the LEMA resulted in a 35% reduction in applied 
inches per acre. The response at the intensive margin is larger than the extensive 
margin, where the extensive margin only resulted in a 3% decrease in irrigated 
acreage. Similar results were found using a Bayesian structural time series model 





Figure 8: Difference-In-Differences Results for Total Irrigated Acreage 
 
 




I additionally consider the crop specific effects from the water policy to identify 
how irrigators of different crops chose to modify their behavior at the extensive and 
intensive margins. Again, comparing to the counterfactual scenario, I find that 
irrigators  chose  to reduce  irrigated  acres  dedicated  to  alfalfa  (-40%)  and  corn  
(-18%). Alternatively, irrigators chose to expand irrigated acreage for sorghum 
(66%), wheat (7%), multiple unknown (17%), and soybean (5%) after the LEMA 
policy (Figures 10-15). Irrigators in the 5 mile zone increased irrigated acreage 
slightly while irrigators in the LEMA boundary decreased irrigated acres slightly. 
I also estimate the response of applied water intensity of irrigators for each 
crop in the LEMA (Figures 16-21). On average, irrigators chose to reduce their 
applied water intensity. It is important to note that although many water rights had 
some sort of crop mix, this analysis could only be applied to water rights that were 
planted to a single crop. The data did not differentiate fields assigned to multiple 
crop mixes and therefore was limited to only water rights of the same crop type. 
Corn and soybean LEMA irrigators primarily responded by reducing average 
applied water compared to irrigators located within the 5 mile boundary who 
applied more inches per acre to these crops. The largest reductions were from wheat 
(-54%) and corn (-46%) followed by alfalfa (-32%), soybean (-28%) and multiple 
unknown  (-16%). The large reduction in multiple crops could be partially attributed 
to the introduction of less water intensive varieties being added to the crop mix. 
However, sorghum irrigators chose to increase applied water per acre by 71% after 
the LEMA policy. 
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Figure 10: Difference-In-Difference Results for Corn Irrigated Acreage 
 
       
 
 






















Figure 16: Difference-In-Differences Results for Corn Applied Water 
Intensity 
 























 6.2 Econometric Results 
 6.2.1 Preferred Specification 
Table 3 reports the set of decomposed marginal effects of water use from the 
preferred fixed effects regression with the LEMA effect adjusted for the log-linear 
form where the total extensive, total intensive, and direct intensive estimates are 
derived from the previous equations (1), (2) and (3), respectively. I find that the 
estimates are significant at the 1% confidence intervals which implies the LEMA 
resulted in a reduction in water use through both the number of total acres irrigated 
(-3.8%) as well as the quantity of applied inches per acre (-21.2%) resulting in an 
overall water use reduction.  
I condition the estimates to include effects from cropping type in order to 
estimate the direct intensive margin (i.e., holding constant land use). I find the 
estimates measure of the direct log of water intensity effect (-18.5%) to be only 
slightly smaller than the total intensive effect (-21.2%) and still significant at the 
1% confidence interval such that the larger intensive response occurs at the direct 
margin indicating little indirect intensive response, i.e. crop switching. I find the 
expected negative signs on the less water-intensive crops for alfalfa (6.1%) 
sorghum (-6.3%) and wheat (-22.6%) when compared to crops within the “other” 
or “multiple crop” category. Additionally, I find positive coefficients for corn 
(18.5%) and soybeans (6.7%) indicative of our more water-intensive crops. The 
larger water use intensity is attributed to corn and wheat, however, which are 
significant to at least the 5% level.  
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I can now follow Hendricks and Peterson (2012) and back out the indirect 
intensive marginal effects by simply subtracting the direct intensive from the total 
intensive margins and find little response (-2.7%) due to changes to cropping 
patterns. 
Table 3: Decomposed Estimates of Marginal Effects of Water Use 
 
  Total Effect Extensive Intensive 
Variable/Statistics    Total Total Direct Indirect 
LEMA policy effect      -0.242**       -0.038**     -0.212** -0.185** -0.027 
      (0.045)       (0.019)     (0.049) (0.046)  
Cropping Type      
Alfalfa       -0.061   
       (0.119)   
Corn        0.185**   
       (0.069)   
Sorghum       -0.063   
       (0.093)   
Soybean        0.067   
       (0.073)   
Wheat       -0.226*   
       (0.112)   
Weather      
Precipitation 
 
     -0.025*       0.010     -0.035** -0.035**  
      (0.012)      (0.007)     (0.012) (0.012)  
Evapotranspiration      -0.035      -0.021     -0.014 -0.046  
      (0.082)      (0.038)     (0.082) (0.075)  
N        2817        2817       2817   2817  
R2     0.1846     0.0076     0.2422 0.2999  
Note: Parentheses denote robust clustered (water right level) std. errors. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 
5% and 1% levels. Farmer-Time specific estimates were removed for conciseness. LEMA effect estimates 





 6.2.2 Water Policy Event Study 
The previous model framework has proven useful in the context of isolating the 
causal parameter of interest, however, I also wish to isolate the effect per year, 
rather than just a pre/post aggregate estimate. I now consider how lags and leads of 
the LEMA policy effect impacts our linear estimation whereby an event study 
(Figure 22 and Table 4) using equations (4), (5), and (6). This approach not only 
will help to validate my identification strategy but also allow us to see if the 
response was different in the first year of the LEMA compared to the second to 
uncover possible adaptation or learning among water right holders. 
First, I find that the coefficients pre-policy are not significantly different from 
zero which signals that my model specification is correct. Additionally, I find that 
the total marginal effect is influenced by similar reductions in water use in both the 
policy year (-31.3%) and 2014 (-32.4%) indicating that irrigators may be attempting 
similar water use modifications year to year that are significant at the 1% level. This 
doesn’t suggest any large adaptation strategies at the extensive margins. However, 
I also find the primary impact of the extensive margin to be from modifications to 
acreage in just the policy year (-5.8%) also significant at the 1% level rather than 
any continued reductions at the extensive margin further post policy. Therefore, it 
appears that farmers may have learned that reductions in intensity were the least 
cost method to reduce water use rather than acreage reductions.  
Furthermore, at the intensive margin, I find that the effect is again influenced 
by reductions in the first year after the policy went into effect (-25.5%) with further 
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reductions in 2014 (-30.4%). This could suggest possible adaptation strategies of 
the irrigators such that they find further room to reduce water use at the intensive 
margin. Although, these findings are consistent with the short-run (intensive) 
marginal adjustments of previous studies further review of ongoing water use 
decisions might indicate if this was due to reduced applied inches/acre or to 
switching out to less water-intensive varieties (Peterson and Ding, 2005; Pfeiffer 
and Lin, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 22: Event Study Results: Average Yearly Impact on Water Use at the 









     2010 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total Effect      -0.048 -0.062 -0.070  -0.313** -0.324** 
      (0.064)     (0.064)     (0.056)   (0.081)   (0.069) 
Extensive      -0.001      0.002     -0.004   -0.058**   -0.020 
      (0.007)     (0.014)     (0.020)   (0.024)   (0.029) 
Intensive      -0.047     -0.064     -0.065   -0.255**   -0.304** 
      (0.064)     (0.064)     (0.057)   (0.087)   (0.072) 
Note: Parentheses denote robust clustered (well-level) std. errors. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 5% and 
1% levels. All estimates adjusted for log-linear correction. 
  
 6.2.3 Heterogeneous Response among Large Irrigators 
A concern of some farmers prior to the LEMA being implemented was that a subset 
of farmers might have a greater ability to adjust to the water use restriction because 
they maintained rights on a much larger proportion of wells. That is, they would 
have the flexibility to move water use between wells and possibly use more water 
relative to what other farmers would have to do resulting in a disproportionate water 
use restriction that ultimately restricts smaller firms more.  
I evaluate this concern through the use of an additional set of fixed effect 
regressions of LEMA irrigators with an additional variable to identify the effect of 
well ownership on applied water intensity and acres irrigated (Table 5). The 
estimates for log water use/acre 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) and log irrigated acres 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) are reported 
from the following regressions: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)  =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +  𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  +  𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡  + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)  =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 +  𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  +  𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡  +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
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where 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, 𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, and 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 represent the fixed effects and controls, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the LEMA 
effect dummy variable, and 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is the dummy variable for large well ownership 
if a water right was owned by an irrigator with 2 or more water rights inside the 
policy boundary (i.e., 2 or more wells inside the LEMA policy boundary). 
 
Table 5: Fixed Effects Regression of Disproportionate Restriction 
 
Variable/Statistics  Total Effect Extensive Intensive 
LEMA Policy Effect      -0.262**   -0.067**   -0.210** 
      (0.079)      (0.028)      (0.082) 
LEMA Large       0.041       0.046       0.005 
      (0.095)      (0.036)      (0.102) 
N        2817        2819        2817 
R2      0.1834       0.0072      0.2423 
Note: The dependent variable is given by the column heading. Parentheses denote robust clustered (well-
level) std. errors. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels. Weather and Farmer-time specific 
estimates were removed for conciseness. LEMA effect estimates adjusted for log-linear correction only. 
 
I find no statistical evidence that having more than one well could encourage 
increased water use among those irrigators and lead to a disproportionate water use 
restriction. Table 5 describes the interaction terms as insignificant at all margins of 
adjustment while the LEMA policy effect estimates continue to remain robust. I 
also conducted estimations at varying levels of well ownership (i.e., >2 or more 
wells) and found that this did not change the significance of the estimates or the 
interpretation of the results. 
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 6.2.4 Alternative Specifications 
While the D-I-D model accounts for unobserved heterogeneity of water rights that 
are constant over time (i.e. water right-specific differences) and of each year that is 
constant across fields (i.e. crop, energy, and other input prices) it is important to 
test for the exclusion of any other additional controls such as the farmer-time fixed 
effect in the preferred model. To do so, I follow Villa (2012) and apply the D-I-D 
kernel propensity score matching estimator.  
The benefit of the matching estimator (as opposed to my fixed effects 
estimator) is that it estimates the effect of treatment by comparing changes n 
outcomes of irrigators inside and outside with similar characteristics (crop type, 
irrigation technology, etc). That is, the D-I-D matching estimator groups irrigators 
belonging to a set of covariates and then compares the change in outcomes of 
irrigators in the LEMA to the change in outcomes of similar irrigators in the control 
group controlling for the observed differences among irrigators.  
I then represent the conditional probability of the LEMA as the propensity 
score conditioned on set 𝑋𝑋 such that the conditional mean is the weighted average 
of outcomes when 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 =  0 and the kernel estimator is represented as: 
















In general, the kernel function is a non-parametric estimation approach of the 
probability density function of a random variable. Villa (2012) uses a default 
estimator with an underlying epanechnikov kernel smoothing function and 0.06 
bandwidth ℎ𝑐𝑐 such that for mean µand indicator function 𝟏𝟏{. . . } defined on the 




(1 − 𝜇𝜇2)𝟏𝟏{|𝜇𝜇|≤1}. 
Recall that I assume that the heterogeneity of the soil type and underlying 
hydrology are already accounted for in the field (water right) fixed effect such that 
I do not include soil or hydrological covariates as these are variables that remain 
constant across time. However, variability in soils related to soil moisture content 
does change over time such that I assume that this variability is embedded in the 
weather variables of precipitation and evapotranspiration. I base the kernel 
propensity score of similar irrigators based on weather, irrigation technology and 
crop type. The results are summarized in Table 6. 
Although I find that failing to account for the differences among irrigators that 
varies through time generates different estimates from our preferred model 
estimates, I find the majority of the response at the total intensive margin (28.1%) 
compared to the total extensive margin (-2.9%) with an overall water use reduction 
of -29.8% which is consistent with our previous descriptive interpretations. 
However, only the response at the intensive margin is statistically significant. I 
additionally explore the importance of the farmer-time effect and the weather 
controls (Table 7).  
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Table 6: Difference-In-Difference Kernel Propensity Score Matching 




 5 Mile LEMA LEMA Effect 
Total Effect Pre-Policy 7.351 7.434  
 Post-Policy       7.411       7.141  
 Difference       0.083**      -0.271**    -0.298** 
       (0.064)      (0.056)    (0.081) 
Extensive Pre-Policy       4.888       4.887  
 Post-Policy       4.902       4.872  
 Difference -0.030      -0.030    -0.029 
  (0.032)      (0.036)    (0.015) 
Intensive Pre-Policy 2.463       2.547  
 Post-Policy       2.515       2.269     
 Difference       0.084**      -0.246**    -0.281** 
      (0.028)      (0.033)    (0.027) 
Notes: * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels. LEMA effect estimates adjusted for log-linear 
correction. 
 
If I assume that unobserved differences across irrigators are constant across 
time, then the addition of a farmer specific fixed effect would suffice. However, in 
our fixed effects model this is already accounted for in the water right fixed effect 
𝛼𝛼 . I suggest the need to additionally account for unobserved differences across 
irrigators that are varying through time, that is, to account for variability due to 
skills, experience, management practices, finances, etc.  
I evaluate the importance of inclusion of these additional model parameters 
and note the changes to the coefficient estimates with varying controls in Table 6 
below. Column (1) indicates the D-I-D estimates that only include a water right-
specific (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) and time-specific (𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡) fixed effect without controls. Column (2) 
additionally includes a set of weather (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) controls that vary across water rights 
and time. Column (3) includes the set of farmer-time effect (𝜆𝜆𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡) but removes the 
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weather controls. Column (4) represents the preferred model with both the farmer-
time effect and weather controls. 
Table 7: Comparison of Marginal Effects Estimates with Varying Controls 
 
  Log Total Applied Inches (Total Effect) 
Variable/Statistics (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LEMA policy effect      -0.330**       -0.312**     -0.251** -0.242** 
      (0.027)       (0.026)     (0.046) (0.034) 
     
Weather     
Precipitation 
 
      -0.039**      -0.025** 
       (0.006)      (0.012) 
Evapotranspiration        0.056  -0.035 
       (0.047)  (0.082) 
Water Right Fixed 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farmer-time Fixed 
 
No No Yes Yes 
N        2817        2817       2817   2817 
R2     0.0708     0.0774     0.1848 0.1846 
Note: Parentheses denote robust clustered (well-level) std. errors. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 5% and 
1% levels. Water right, Time and Farmer-time specific estimates were removed for conciseness (N>1000). 
LEMA effect estimates adjusted for log-linear correction. 
 
I find confirmation that adding in the weather controls does little to the 
estimates by comparing columns (1) and (2). However, by comparing columns (2) 
and (3) the addition of the farmer-time effect changes the impact more. This lends 
evidence for the preferred specification such that removing the farmer-time effect 
and weather controls will inflate the causal estimate of the LEMA effect. Although 
the weather controls are of no dire consequence to this study, this is likely due to 
the fact that the policy area is small and little variability exists in the weather data. 
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 6.2.5 Falsifications Tests 
I want to alleviate any concerns that the control group might have selection bias or 
rather, is not indeed a valid counterfactual such that LEMA farmers would have 
acted as the control had they not been under the LEMA policy. I compare the 5 
Mile control group to a 10 mile control group and run the same fixed effects model 
of marginal elasticities as a falsification test. There is no statistical difference 
between the two groups, and as such I have confidence that no selection bias is in 
the chosen 5 mile boundary as the basis of comparison for the LEMA (Table 8).  
Table 8: Falsification Test: Measuring the Difference Between a 5 Mile and a 
10 Mile Counterfactual Control Group 
  Total Effect Extensive Intensive 
Variable/Statistics    Total Total Direct 
LEMA policy effect       0.028        0.002      0.028  0.033 
      (0.103)       (0.051)     (0.109) (0.107) 
Cropping Type     
Alfalfa    -0.112 
    (0.116) 
Corn    -0.005 
    (0.087) 
Sorghum     0.159 
    (0.189) 
Soybean    -0.142 
    (0.091) 
Wheat    -0.205 
    (0.135) 
Weather     
Precipitation (inches)      -0.014       0.008  -0.022 -0.018 
      (0.014)      (0.008)  (0.015) (0.015) 
Evapotranspiration      -0.060       0.198     -0.138 -0.194 
      (0.238)      (0.147)     (0.249) (0.259) 
N        1443        1443       1443   1441 
R2     0.1791     0.0161    0.2814 0.2908 
Note: The dependent variable is given by the column heading. Parentheses denote robust clustered (water 
right level) std. errors. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels. Farmer-Time specific estimates 
were removed for conciseness. LEMA effect estimates adjusted for log-linear correction only. 
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I also construct a false timing policy to see if there is any statistical significance 
from our fixed effects model framework. I restrict the data to 2009 through 2012 
(prior to the LEMA) and create a false policy effect in 2010. I run my previous 
regressions for decomposed marginal estimates and find all marginal effects to be 
small with no statistical significance (Table 9). This indicates the effect is not 
statistically different from zero and we can infer a non-effect from the ficticious 
2010 policy. This establishes our statistical importance of the LEMA policy effect. 
 
Table 9: Falsification Test: The Marginal Effects of a False 2010 Time Signal 
   Total Effect Extensive Intensive 
Variable/Statistics    Total Total Direct 
FALSE policy effect      -0.052       -0.001     -0.052 -0.040 
      (0.037)       (0.015)     (0.038) (0.107) 
Cropping Type     
Alfalfa    -0.083 
    (0.124) 
Corn     0.105 
    (0.066) 
Sorghum     0.077 
    (0.104) 
Soybean     0.002 
    (0.091) 
Wheat    -0.421** 
    (0.158) 
Weather     
Precipitation (inches)      -0.010       0.004  -0.014 -0.018 
      (0.013)      (0.005)  (0.013) (0.014) 
Evapotranspiration      -0.076       0.004     -0.014 -0.018 
      (0.013)      (0.005)     (0.078) (0.074) 
N        1889        1889       1889   1889 
R2     0.8063     0.3405    0.7754 0.7880 
Note: The dependent variable is given by the column heading. Parentheses denote robust clustered (water 
right level) std. errors. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels. Farmer-Time specific estimates 
were removed for conciseness. LEMA effect estimates adjusted for log-linear correction only. 
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The fixed effects model is an important framework for identifying the 
causal parameter of interest and provides insight into how irrigators chose to 
change their water use behavior at the extensive and intensive margins. However, 
I additionally want to further describe the heterogeneity in water use decisions 
among the LEMA irrigators. Although this portion of the study is just a pre/post 
policy comparison of changes inside the LEMA and therefore cannot be identified 
as occurring due to the water policy (i.e. because there is no counterfactual 
scenario), it is still useful to extend our analysis of how irrigators chose to change 
their water use behavior into more detailed descriptive statistics 
 6.3 Heterogeneous Response of LEMA Irrigators 
I decompose the intensive response to determine reductions as either changes in 
applied inches/acre or irrigators modifying the crop type planted, however, this 
method cannot be applied at the extensive margin. I do wish to provide further 
description of this response based on varying characteristics among the irrigators.  
I am first interested in the proportion of water right holders that chose to reduce 
irrigated acreage because I found that there was very little average response at the 
total extensive margin. Out of 184 unique LEMA water rights, the majority of 
LEMA water right holders (99) made no changes to irrigated acreage. However, of 
the LEMA irrigators that chose to modify their acreage, 28 water rights had 
reductions up to 10 acres and 18 water rights had expand up to 10 acres, followed 
by various changes in irrigated acreage in much smaller proportions among 




Figure 23: Distribution of Water Rights that Made Changes to Total 
Irrigated Acres 
 
I am also interested to see the variability in response to changes in irrigated 
acres among the 180 LEMA water rights holders who have a pivot-drop system 
(87%) as indicated in the summary statistics. Many LEMA water rights (101) that 
have a pivot-drop system maintained the same level of irrigated acreage. Of those 
water rights associated with pivot drop systems and changes to irrigated acreage, 
the majority of irrigators (24) chose to reduce up to 10 acres and 13 irrigators chose 
to expand up to 10 acres, followed again by various changes in irrigated acreage in 
much smaller proportions among the remaining water right holders (Figure 24). 
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Figure 24: Distribution of Irrigators with Pivot-Drop Systems that Made 
Changes to Total Irrigated Acres 
 
I additionally consider the heterogeneous response as it relates to crop specific 
and farmer-specific responses. Of the 184 water rights, all water rights associated 
with alfalfa, wheat, and other crops made no changes to irrigated acreage after the 
LEMA went into effect. For the water rights that were associated with changes to 
irrigated acreage, I find the majority of reductions (157) to come from corn with 13  
water rights reducing up to 10 acres, followed by 11 water rights expanding up to 
10 acres (Figure 25). Soybean farmers had primarily 30-50 acre reductions with 
only 1 farmer choosing to expand up to 10 acres (Figure 26). Additionally, I find 
that all sorghum water rights expanded irrigated acreage between 80-140 acres 













Figure 27: Change in Irrigated Sorghum Acres (By Water Rights) 
 
 6.4 Field and Farmer Specific Characteristics 
Because irrigators can have multiple water rights and multiple wells, I wish to 
explore the heterogeneity as it relates to well ownership and irrigated acreage 
among irrigators. Although we previously selected our unique identifier as the 
water right itself it is now necessary to use the irrigator ID and well ID as the unique 
identifier. This is because irrigators may have multiple water rights on the same 
field or a water right may be associated with multiple wells that are irrigating 
different crops.  
Additionally, because of the nature of water rights and land values, the same 
well cannot be attached to multiple water rights. Because I want to uncover the 
heterogeneity of the response I do not want to aggregate these descriptive statistics 
to the same water right ID, but rather maintain the disaggregated information in the 
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data. Figure 28 indicates that the majority of irrigators inside the LEMA had access 
to just one (38) well followed by irrigators who maintained 2 or more wells.  
Although many corn farmers (14) made no change to irrigated acreage, the 
majority of corn farmers (17) reduced irrigated acreage up to 10 acres (Figure 29). 
Furthermore, all sorghum acreage was expanded new post policy acreage between 
100-130 irrigated acres. For soybean farmers, although 5 irrigators made no change 
to soybean acreage, I find a split between farmers who chose to expand (3) or reduce 
(3) acres irrigated (Figure 30). As a result, we can see more clearly how the small 
reductions of the majority of corn farmers did little to offset the larger expansions 
in soybean and sorghum (Figure 31) of a small number of farmers and resulted in 
little total extensive marginal response. 
 














Figure 31: Change in Irrigated Sorghum Acres (per Farmer) 
 
 6.5 Large Irrigators 
I previously found that 49 irrigators chose to make no changes to irrigated acreage. 
I also indicated that there was no evidence to suggest that irrigators inside the 
LEMA who managed more than one well would increase applied water use. In 
Figure 32 we see how the majority of irrigators with only one well who managed 
the same crop across all years also chose to expand acreage up to 10 acres but very 
few irrigators with multiple wells increased irrigated acres beyond that lending 




Figure 32: Disproportionate Water Use Among Farmers 
 
I also restrict large irrigators of the same crop using a pivot-drop irrigation 
system and find that the majority of these water right holders reduced acreage. This 
provides further evidence that the majority of the response was related to decisions 
of crop type (more water-intensive varieties) rather than more efficient technologies 
are impacting the extensive marginal effects (Figure 33). This is consistent with the 
findings of Hornbeck and Keskin (2014) in that irrigated land use has adjusted 
toward water-intensive crops. 
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Figure 33: Disproportionate Water Use Among Pivot System Farmers 
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Chapter 7 - Results: Changes in Cropping Patterns and 
Input Expenditures 
Given the LEMA policy significantly impacted planted acres, there could be 
substantial impacts on seed and chemical expenditures. The results in Table 3 from 
Chapter 6 indicate that farmers inside the LEMA responded primarily at the intensive 
margin by reducing their intensity of applied inches per acre. This result is consistent 
with numerical simulations of Foster et al. (2014) and Wibowo et al. (2017) that 
indicate that irrigators respond to reduced water availability by first reducing water use 
at the intensive margin. It is important to note, however, that large restrictions could in 
turn cause farmers to have a greater response at the extensive margin whereby reducing 
crop acreage.  
Nevertheless, even the relatively small changes to cropping patterns have impacts 
on other agricultural sectors. Using Kansas State University’s crop budgets for 
Northwestern Kansas, I estimate the effect the LEMA could have on expenditures for 
corn, soybean, sorghum, and wheat. The subsequent effects of irrigation on other 
agricultural sectors have also received substantial interest (e.g., Hornbeck and Keskin, 
2015). While I do not have actual input data, I can approximate the effects on inputs 
by using the estimates of changes in cropping patterns and information obtained from 
Kansas State University irrigated crop budgets. Table 10 shows the irrigated input 
expenditures for each crop. I use the average of sorghum and wheat for the crop 
category identified as “other” and assume the input of alfalfa to be similar of “other 
crops” and apply those input expenditure estimates.  
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Table 10: Input Expenditure by Crop Type 
Expenditure per Acre 
Input Corn Soybean Sorghum Wheat Other 
Fertilizer $84.18 $18.83 $60.93 $38.74 $49.84 
Herbicide $48.95 $34.95 $6.31 $41.25 $23.78 
Insecticide $14.57 - - - - 
Seed $113.92 $55.50 $18.00 $14.92 $16.46 
Note: “Other” crop expenditures are calculated as the average of sorghum and wheat expenditures. 
Alfalfa expenditures are assumed to be the same as “Other” expenditures. 
 
Unfortunately, I also do not know the exact allocation of crops used in the category 
identified as “multiple crops”, however, I can use a general allocation as follows: 50% 
corn, 20% soybeans, 10% wheat, 10% sorghum, 5% alfalfa and 5% other. I can then 
add this allocation to the individual crop shares to determine an overall crop share 
estimate (Table 11). I then further calculate the change in expenditures for fertilizer, 
herbicide, insecticide, and seed using the pre-treatment average share of each crop from 
Table 10 and the change in the share of each crop due to the LEMA effect  using the 
preferred fixed effects model specification column (1) from Tables 12 and 13 to get the 
resulting input expenditure effects (Table 14). 
 
Table 11:Pre LEMA Average Share of Crop Irrigated Acres 
Pre Policy Share of Acres inside LEMA Boundary   
 Corn Soybean Sorghum Wheat Alfalfa Other Multi 
Mean 0.683 0.182 0.002 0.022 0.013 0.008 0.088 
% of Multi 
 
 
0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.05  
MultiShare 0.044 0.018 0.0088 0.0088 0.0044 0.0044  






Table 12: LEMA Effect on Share of Corn, Soybean and Sorghum 
Irrigated Acres 
Variable/Statistic Change in Share Acres 
Corn (1) (2) 
LEMA Effect -0.125* -0.075* 
 (0.0450) (0.030) 
Weather   
Precipitation (inches) -0.004 -0.013* 
 (0.015) (0.006) 
Evapotranspiration 0.139 0.118* 
 (0.137) (0.044) 
N 2819 2819 
R2 0.5018 0.0130 
   
Soybean   
LEMA Effect 0.005 0.009 
 (0.047) (0.022) 
Weather   
Precipitation (inches) 0.007 0.007 
 (0.013) (0.005) 
Evapotranspiration 0.059 -0.060 
 (0.122) (0.033) 
N 2819 2819 
R2 0.4761 0.0120 
   
Sorghum   
LEMA Effect    0.081**     0.415** 
 (0.028) (0.014) 
Weather   
Precipitation (inches) -0.002 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.002) 
Evapotranspiration -0.019 -0.033 
 (0.026) (0.014) 
N 2819 2819 
R2 0.5185 0.0312 
Water Right Fixed 
 
Yes Yes 




Note: Parentheses denote robust clustered (water right level) std. errors. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 





Table 13: LEMA Effect on Share of Wheat, Alfalfa and Other 
Irrigated Acres 
Variable/Statistic Change in Share Acres 
Wheat (1) (2) 
LEMA Effect 0.028 0.007 
 (0.031) (0.147) 
Weather   
Precipitation (inches) -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.003) 
Evapotranspiration -0.002 0.012 
 (0.037) (0.019) 
N 2819 2819 
R2 0.5895 (0.051) 
   
Alfalfa   
LEMA Effect 0.006 -0.004 
 (0.010) (0.006) 
Weather   
Precipitation (inches) -0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Evapotranspiration 0.146 -0.011 
 (0.013) (0.009) 
N 2819 2819 
R2 0.5432 0.0065 
   
Other   
LEMA Effect 0.001 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.008) 
Weather   
Precipitation (inches) 0.002 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.002) 
Evapotranspiration 0.012 0.002 
 (0.017) (0.013) 
N 2819 2819 
R2 0.4377 0.0016 
Water Right Fixed 
 
Yes Yes 




Note: Parentheses denote robust clustered (water right level) std. errors. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 
5% and 1% levels. Farmer-Time specific estimates were removed for conciseness. 
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Table 14: LEMA Effect on Crop Specific Input Expenditures 
 Pre Policy LEMA Effect Post Policy  % Change 
Fertilizer      
Corn 
 
$61.45 -$10.52 $50.93  -17% 
Soybean $3.77  $0.09 $3.86  2% 
Sorghum $0.61  $4.94 $5.55  809% 
Wheat $1.16  $1.9 $3.06  469% 
Alfalfa $1.00 $0.30 $1.30  30% 
Other $1.00  $0.05 $1.05  2% 
 $79.94  $65.75  -18% 
Herbicide      
Corn 
 
$35.73 -$6.12 $29.61  -17% 
Soybean $6.99  $0.17 $7.16  2% 
Sorghum $3.71  $0.51 $4.22  14% 
Wheat $0.69 $1.16 $1.85  168% 
Alfalfa $11.89 $0.14 $12.03  1% 
Other $11.89 $0.02 $11.91  2% 
 $70.90  $66.78  -6% 
Insecticide      
Corn 
 
$10.57 -$1.82 $8.75  -17% 
Soybean -  -   0% 
Sorghum -  -   0% 
Wheat - -   0% 
Alfalfa - -   0% 
Other - -   0% 
 $10.57 -$1.82 $8.75  -17% 
Seed      
Corn 
 
$83.16 -$14.24 $68.92  -17% 
Soybean $11.10  $0.28 $11.38  2% 
Sorghum $1.34 $1.46 $2.80  109% 
Wheat $1.98 $0.42 $2.40  21% 
Alfalfa $0.82 $0.10 $0.92  12% 
Other $0.82  $0.02 $0.80  2% 
 $99.22  $88.22  -11% 





The effect of the LEMA resulted primarily in reductions to corn (12.5%), however, 
corn has relatively higher input expenditures compared to soybean, wheat, sorghum 
and alfalfa. Because of this impacts to input expenditures will be largely driven by the 
subsequent impacts to changes in corn acreage.  For farmers within the LEMA, overall 
seed and chemical expenditures dropped significantly, especially for corn. The overall 
reduction was roughly 15 percent (Table 14). Although many individual crops, such as 
sorghum and wheat, had an increase in overall expenditures, the relative share and 
associated costs were dominated by the reductions in corn expenditures. Herbicide and 
insecticide expenditures declined by 6 and 17 percent, respectively. Seed expenditures 
dropped by 11 percent and the largest reductions occurred for fertilizer expenditures at 
17 percent. I discussed in Chapter 6 that the LEMA effect had a relatively small impact 
on water savings due to changes in cropping patterns, however, we can see that the 
subsequent changes on chemical and seed expenditures was quite large. These results 
have important implications for the impact of the LEMA on agribusiness firms that sell 
inputs to farmers.  
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Chapter 8 - Results: Changes in Crop Yields 
 8.1 D-I-D Model and Visual Analysis 
In total there are 1,434 observations for corn and only 189 observations for 
soybeans as there are relatively few water rights subject to the LEMA that are 
planted solely to soybeans. I first estimate the effects of water use intensity on yields 
from the LEMA using a standard D-I-D framework. The D-I-D model accounts for 
unobserved heterogeneity of water rights that are constant over time (i.e. water 
right-specific differences) and also accounts for the annual heterogeneity that is 
constant across fields (i.e. crop, energy, and other input prices). The results in Table 
15 indicate a 14.16% reduction in response to the LEMA for corn and a reduction 
of 5.57% for soybeans. These D-I-D results are visualized in Figures 34 and 35. 
Table 15: Difference-in-Difference for Yields 
 Intensive Margin 
 LEMA 5 Mile Dif 
Corn    
Pre 200.68 201.51   -0.83 
 (1.456) (1.286)  
Post 181.42 194.75 -13.33 
 (1.484) (1.394)  
 19.26 6.76 -14.16 
    
Soybean 19.26 6.76 -14.16 
Pre 64.24 61.67    2.57 
 (0.995) (1.134)  
Post 58.82 61.82  -3.00 
 (1.019) (1.600)  
 5.42     -0.15  -5.57 









Figure 35: Difference-In-Difference Results for Soybean Yields 
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 8.2 Econometric Results 
Additionally, it is important to consider the need for other control variables 
such as the farmer-time fixed effects that was used in the preferred model when 
investigating the effects at the intensive and extensive margins of water use. It is 
worth noting, however, that in the case of soybeans I have a large number of right 
hand side variables compared to a relatively small number of observations that 
make this unfeasible. 
Table 16 shows the D-I-D regression results. For corn, I find that both models 
(1) and (2) report statistically significant results at the 1% confidence interval, 
however, if we exclude the farmer-time fixed effects (2) we estimate a smaller effect 
of the LEMA on yields by 1.87%, such that the estimated effect on corn yield is a 
reduction of  8.37%. For soybeans, I find that when I include the farmer-time fixed 
effects, the model produces an unlikely result (4). The result for the model omitting 
the farmer-time fixed effects indicates a smaller but statistically significant 
reduction for soybean yield of 4.18% in response to the LEMA (4).  
Although I cannot quantify the exact short-run welfare impacts from the 
LEMA without observed yield data or production cost data, I can use this 
information combined with average price data to discuss the further implications of 
farmers’ welfare. USDA Quickstats (2017) indicates estimates of average bushels 
per acre for corn in neighboring Thomas County, KS to be 200.9 in 2014 and 192.5 
in 2011. USDA indicates soybean yield to be 59 bushels per acre in both 2006 and 
2007. I find similar estimates in average predicted yields for the sample area for 
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corn and soybean of 197.76 and 62.22, respectfully.  Schnitkey and Hubbs (2015) 
indicate that a price for corn of $3.50 and $9.75 for soybean for the 2018-2019 
marketing year to be realistic estimates. This indicates average revenues per acre 
for corn at $692.16 and soybean at $606.65. Combining this with the estimates 
produced from Table 16 we can estimate the subsequent reductions on crop 
revenues to be -$57.93 per acre for corn and -$25.36 per acre for soybean. The 
impacts on profits might not have been as large if producers chose to adjust other 
costs of production (e.g. applied less additional inputs.) 
 
Table 16: Comparison of Models of Effects of Yields 
  Log Yield  
Variable/Statistics Corn Soybean 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LEMA policy effect      -10.24**         -8.37**      - 4.18*   47.72 
      (2.299)       (0.980)     (0.603) (4.217) 
Weather     
Precipitation (inches)         0.03**          0.01**         0.73     0.02 
      (0.008)       (0.031)           -                      (0.256) 
Evapotranspiration        -0.01          0.03         3.92     0.06 
      (0.044)       (0.017)           -     (0.056) 
Water Right Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farmer-time Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes 
N 1430 1430 187 187 
R2 0.0708 0.0774 0.1848 0.1846 
Note: Parentheses denote robust clustered (well-level) std. errors. ∗ and ∗∗ denote significance at the 5% and 
1% levels. Water right, Time and Farmer-time specific estimates were removed for conciseness (N>1000). 
LEMA effect estimates adjusted for log-linear correction. 
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Chapter 9 - Conclusion 
This research uses an econometric approach to uncover the effects on water use and 
crop type from the collective action water management plan identified as the 
Sheridan 6 LEMA. Many agricultural businesses will also be impacted by changes 
in these on-farm decisions through changes to additional input markets such as 
fertilizer use, seed and grain flows. The possibility of new water restricted areas has 
increasingly become a topic for producers and agribusinesses and collective action 
management plans are a potential policy instrument to sustain the life of the High 
Plains Aquifer for generations to come with the recent implementation of two 
additional LEMAs: the district-wide GMD 4 and the Rattlesnake/Quivara 
management area. 
 There are some limitations to this research. I had limited observations for 
many crops apart from corn and soybean, the primary crops of the area, such that I 
could not estimate some crop specific yields in a meaningful way. Additionally, I 
did not know the exact proportion of acreage for farmers who implemented crop 
rotations or had acreage planted to multiple crops, as such I had to make 
assumptions on particular crop mixes to obtain results.  I also did not have actual 
yield data and used simulated data such that it is possible that my yield curve is 
misspecified. Additionally, I used average  pricing data such that I had to assume 
average prices to determine subsequent outcomes on farmers’ welfare. It is also 
possible that irrigators could have made adjustments to minimize any yield losses. 
Additionally, this research only includes 2 years of post-policy data, which provides 
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us with insight on the very short run decisions of the irrigators inside the LEMA, 
however, the policy directive is for 5 years.  It would be important to run the same 
analysis in the future to capture the full effect of the policy. Importantly, farmers’ 
decisions in the first four years could impact how much water they use in the final 
year. It is possible that water use in the last year may have increased compared to 
earlier years when farmers know how much allotment they have remaining, 
assuming they sufficiently reduced water use the prior four years. 
Using a Difference-in-Differences (D-I-D) model I expose the causal effect of 
the LEMA policy on important farmer decisions relating to water use, yields and 
inputs. The more simplistic D-I-D framework allows us to estimate the before and 
after difference inside the LEMA and compare it to the before and after difference 
in the 5 mile buffer zone (control group) just outside the LEMA. This model is strict 
in its assumptions and I find evidence for an alternative regression model that 
controls for variability of each farmer across time by including the use of farmer-
specific year fixed effects. This accounts for farmer variability not captured in the 
time fixed effect or the irrigator fixed effect relating to differences among irrigators 
such as skills, experience, management practices, and finances. Additionally, my 
proposed econometric framework allows for identification of the direct extensive 
(changes to irrigated acreage), direct intensive (changes to applied inches/acre) and 
indirect intensive (changes to crop type) margins of adjustment.  
There are two main findings on the change in water use due to the LEMA. 
First, irrigators located inside the boundary of the LEMA made relatively small 
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changes to total number of reduced irrigated acres and some irrigators moved from 
high water intensity crops to less water-intensive crops. Second, irrigators chose to 
apply significantly less water in inches per acre on corn and soybeans when 
compared to irrigators located in the control group which are the major crops grown 
in the region.  
I find the greatest response to the LEMA at the intensive margin, implying that 
irrigators chose to reduce their applied water intensity by 21% with limited 
reductions in irrigated acreage (4%) indicating that the greater proportion of 
changes to applied inches of water per acre was not due to changes in cropping 
patterns and irrigation technology but due to reductions in applied water use 
intensities for the same crops.  
Additionally, I evaluate concerns that irrigators with ownership of more than 
one well may lead to disproportionate water use restrictions due to the flexibility to 
move water rights between fields. I find no evidence that increased well ownership 
leads to increased water use and impacts smaller farms in greater proportion. In 
general, the collective action management plan was able to reduce water use overall 
having a positive impact on the aquifer and irrigators were able to reduce their water 
use intensity by a larger margin than reductions in irrigated acreage to comply with 
the provisions.  
The impact of the LEMA significantly impacted producers choices on how much 
water to use and the crops raised. Fewer irrigated acres were planted to corn with the 
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primary switch being to sorghum and soybeans. These changes have an impact on the 
crop input markets such as herbicides, pesticides, fertilizer and seed.  
Although reductions in water use will slow the depletion of the aquifer, many 
additional agricultural businesses will be directly impacted by changes in water use 
decisions. My results indicate reductions to both corn (-8.37%) and soybean yields 
(-4.18%) as a direct effect of the LEMA. This has subsequent impacts to many 
businesses that could be impacted by changes in these on-farm decisions and 
additionally has important implications for the entire agricultural sector.  
Not only does water use have a direct relationship with weather and climate 
variation, it also has a relationship to other on-farm production decisions including 
seed, herbicide and fertilizer use. The reduction in water use in the Sheridan County 
LEMA was estimated to reduce crop input expenditures of herbicides, pesticides, 
fertilizer and seed by roughly 15%. Although there were increases in many individual 
crop input expenditures, the relative share and associated costs were outshadowed by 
the reductions in corn expenditures. On the other hand, reduced groundwater depletion 
means that there will likely be more seed and chemical purchases in the future by 
extending the life of the aquifer. Producers have also made changes to irrigated acreage 
and have opted to switch crops for less water-intensive varieties although these changes 
were not the predominant factor.  
The results from this study will prove useful to identify how irrigators adapted 
to the water policy restriction known as the LEMA and provide a framework that 
more accurately estimates the effect of a water policy. The possibility of new water 
restricted areas has increasingly become a topic for irrigators in Kansas. Reduced 
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water use can extend the life of the aquifer but it is important to understand how 
farmers adapt and the subsequent impacts on farmers’ profitability and input 
markets within the agricultural sector. Discussions for the implementation of new 
LEMAs are currently being conducted in other areas of Kansas and this analysis is 
beneficial to stakeholders in these areas and also has broader implications on water 
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Appendix A - STATA CODE 
*************************************************************************
******* 
***Analysis of the Sheridan 6 LEMA inside/outside 5 Mile D-I-D 
Model*** 
























//Step 1: Clean Data for Combining Datasets 
 
*Import Water Use Data* 
*Kansas Water Rights Information System Database (WRIS) after 
*running the Water Group Tool in GIS 
 
import delimited "..\dataAnalysis\Model and Output 
files\ Kansas_PDIV_Reg_WaterGroup.csv" 
duplicates report 
duplicates report fpdiv_key 
*duplicates list fpdiv_key 
*list in 13937/13938 
duplicates drop fpdiv_key, force 
*Bring in the actual reported Water Use Data 
merge 1:m fpdiv_key using 
"..\dataRaw\Water_Use_1991_2012.dta", /// keep(match 
using) nogen 
 
*Note: wuadet_key needs to be unique to avoid double-
counting duplicates report wuadet_key 
 
*remove unwanted data 
drop join_count target_fid wrf_active right_type vcnty_code /// 
wr_num wr_qual wrf_status source s_umw priority fpv_active 
twp_dir /// rng_dir dwr_id feet_north feet_west qual_four 
qual_three qual_two /// qual_one fo_num basin_num basin_name 
gwmd_num sua_code stream_num /// num_wells lot_number 
lot_qual1 lot_qual2 fpdiv_comm fpdiv_key wrf_key /// 
longitude latitude quant_id auth_quant add_quant quant_unit 
qstor_ind /// rate_id auth_rate add_rate rate_unit rstor_ind 
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last_name first_name /// wris_date file_id name status fid_s 
shape_leng shape_area objectid /// wuacor_num wuafo_num 
wuaumwcode hours_pump pump_rate meter_qty /// meter_unit 
wur_code rpt_wright date_meas dpth_water dpth_well reel_num 
/// blip_num rpt_date chem_ind b_meter_rd e_meter_rd fid 
policy regulation /// grp_wr_cnt grp_pd_cnt 
 
*Update:(need to reformat to merge with new 2013 short data format) 
destring wuapers_id, generate (WUAPERS_ID) ignore(",") 
float drop wuapers_id 
destring wua_year, generate (WUA_YEAR) ignore(",") 
float drop wua_year 
destring wr_id, generate(WR_ID) ignore(",") 
float drop wr_id 
destring pdiv_id, generate(PDIV_ID) ignore(",") 
float drop pdiv_id 
destring acres_irr, generate(ACRES_IRR) ignore(",") 
float drop acres_irr 





destring tacres_irr, generate(TACRES_IRR) ignore(",") float 
drop tacres_irr 
destring nacres_irr, generate(NACRES_IRR) ignore(",") float 
drop nacres_irr 
destring wr_group, generate(WR_GROUP) ignore(",") float 
drop wr_group 
 
destring crop_code, replace force 
sort crop_code 
gen CROP_CODE = crop_code 
drop crop_code 
 
generate TYPE_SYSTEM = system 
drop system 
generate UMW_CODE = umw_code 
drop umw_code 
 
rename twp TWP 
rename rng RNG 
rename sect SECT 
rename cnty_abrev CNTY_ABREV 
 




*Bring in New 2013 Annual Reporting to match existing Data 
 
import excel "..\dataRaw\ORR_6440_Statewide_2013_Wuse_Data.xlsx", /// 
sheet("Sheet1") firstrow clear 
drop NEW_LONGITUDE NEW_LATITUDE 
drop if WUA_YEAR == . 
 
save "..\dataRaw\Cleaned_ORR_6440_Statewide_2013_Wuse_Data.dta", replace 
clear 
use "..\dataRaw\Cleaned_ORR_6440_Statewide_2013_Wuse_Data.dta", clear 
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**Bring in New 2014 Annual Reporting to match existing Data 
clear 
import excel "..\dataRaw\ORR_7202_2014_WUse_Data.xlsx", sheet("Sheet1") /// 
firstrow clear 
drop NEW_LONGITUDE NEW_LATITUDE 
drop if WUA_YEAR == . 
 
save "..\dataRaw\Cleaned_ORR_7202_2014_WUse_Data.dta", replace 
clear 
use "..\dataRaw\Cleaned_ORR_7202_2014_WUse_Data.dta", clear 
 
append using "..\dataRaw\Cleaned_ORR_6440_Statewide_2013_Wuse_Data.dta", /// 
force 
save "..\dataRaw\Cleaned_ORR_6440_Statewide_2013_2014_Wuse_Data.dta", /// 
replace 
append using "..\dataAnalysis\Model and Output files\ 
Cleaned_MERGED_WATER_USE_Kansas_PDIV_Reg_W.dta", force 
 
*Generate Unique variable to sort on 
 
egen unique = concat (WR_ID PDIV_ID) 
destring unique, replace 
sort unique WUA_YEAR 
 
 
replace TWP = TWP[_n-1] if TWP >= . and unique[_n-1]== unique 
replace RNG = RNG[_n-1] if RNG >= . and unique[_n-1]== unique 
replace SECT = SECT[_n-1] if SECT >= . and unique[_n-1]== unique 
replace CNTY_ABREV = "." if missing(CNTY_ABREV) 
replace CNTY_ABREV = CNTY_ABREV[_n-1] if CNTY_ABREV >= "." and 
/// unique[_n-1]== unique 
replace TACRES_IRR = TACRES_IRR[_n-1] if TACRES_IRR >= . and 
/// unique[_n-1]== unique 
replace NACRES_IRR = NACRES_IRR[_n-1] if NACRES_IRR >= . and 
/// unique[_n-1]== unique 
replace WR_GROUP = WR_GROUP[_n-1] if WR_GROUP >= . and 
/// unique[_n-1]== unique 
replace WUAPERS_ID = WUAPERS_ID[_n-1] if WUAPERS_ID >= . and 
/// unique[_n-1]== unique 
 
*Final Kansas Water Use Dataset 1991-2014 (Dataset 1) 
 
*********************************************  





//MODIFY PRISM WEATHER DATA// 
******************************************************************************** 
 
//Step 2: Combine PRISM data 2009-2014 with Water Use Data 
*Modify PRISM data to match Water use data 
clear 
use "..\dataRaw\PLSS_PRISM_2009to14_CLEAN.dta" 
*Reformat to match variable names 
rename township TWP 
rename  range RNG 
rename isp_sectio SECT 
rename year WUA_YEAR 
rename month MONTH 
 
*Convert ppt from mm to inches 
replace ppt = ppt*(1/25.4) 
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*Total avg annuals 
 
collapse (rawsum) ppt ET0, /// 
by (TWP RNG SECT WUA_YEAR) 
sum 
 
*Final Kansas Weather (monthly at TWP SECT RNG:3,801,096 obs) (Dataset 2) 
 
*********************************************  





MERGE WATER and WEATHER DATA// 
******************************************************************************** 
 
//Step 3: Match to TWP SECT RNG in the LEMA water use dataset 
 
*Begin with the Water use data (Dataset 1) 
 
use "..\dataRaw\Cleaned_Water_Use_1991_2014_Export_Output.dta" 
sort WR_ID WUA_YEAR 
sort SECT 
 
*Bring in the Weather Data (Dataset 2) 
 




sort WR_ID WUA_YEAR 
 
*Kansas Water and Weather (Dataset 3) 
 
*********************************************  




//Step 3: Prepare Dataset to include variables for D-I-D LEMA and 5 Mile groups 
 
*Add Dummy Variables for LEMA and 5 Mile to the original datasets 
 
*5 mile boundary data taken from ArcGIS Clipping Model** 
clear 
set more off 
import delimited "..\dataAnalysis\Model and Output files\5 Mile PDIV\ 
Sheridan_LEMA_5Mile_Export_Output.csv" 
 
*check for unique observations 
 
duplicates report fpdiv_key 
duplicates drop fpdiv_key, force 
 
generate FIVE_MILE = 1 
generate LEMA = 0 
drop fid wrf_active right_type vcnty_code wr_num wr_qual wrf_status /// 
source s_umw priority fpv_active twp_dir rng_dir dwr_id feet_north /// 
feet_west qual_four qual_three qual_two qual_one fo_num basin_num /// 
basin_name gwmd_num cnty_abrev sua_code stream_num num_wells lot_number /// 
lot_qual1 lot_qual2 fpdiv_comm fpdiv_key wrf_key longitude latitude /// 
quant_id quant_unit qstor_ind rate_id rate_unit rstor_ind last_name /// 
first_name wris_date file_id auth_quant add_quant auth_rate add_rate /// 
grp_wr_cnt grp_pd_cnt 
*Reformat to match variable names 
generate WR_ID = wr_id 
drop wr_id 
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generate PDIV_ID = pdiv_id 
drop pdiv_id 
generate UMW_CODE = umw_code 
drop umw_code 
generate SECT = sect 
drop sect 
generate TWP = twp 
drop twp 
generate RNG = rng 
drop rng 
 
*Restrict dataset to only irrigated users 
keep if UMW_CODE=="IRR" 




*Bring in LEMA inside boundary taken from Water Office GIS files 
 
import excel "..\dataRaw\ORS_6440_SD_6_LEMA_WR_IDs_PDIV_IDs.xlsx", /// 
sheet("Sheet1") firstrow 
 
* Note: These are all irrigated water rights 
gen UMW_CODE="IRR" 
 
*check for unique observations 
duplicates report WR_ID PDIV_ID UMW_CODE 
generate FIVE_MILE = 0 
 
save "..\dataAnalysis\Model and Output files\Restricted PDIV\ 
Cleaned_Sheridan_LEMA.dta", replace 
 
**Add back in the 5 Mile PDIV for the D-I-D Analysis 
 
append using "..\dataAnalysis\Model and Output files\5 Mile PDIV\ 
Cleaned_Sheridan_LEMA_5Mile_Export_Output.dta", force 
 
*Reformat to match variable names 
generate TACRES_IRR = tacres_irr 
drop tacres_irr 
generate NACRES_IRR = nacres_irr 
drop nacres_irr 
generate WR_GROUP = wr_group 
drop wr_group 
 
* Note: Two observations are reported as both inside the LEMA and in the 5 
* mile boundary. Assume the KDA report on points of diversion inside the 
* LEMA is correct so drop if a duplicate and if FIVE_MILE==1 
 
duplicates report WR_ID PDIV_ID 
duplicates tag WR_ID PDIV_ID, gen(dup) 
list if dup==1 
drop if dup==1 and FIVE_MILE==1 
duplicates report WR_ID PDIV_ID 
drop dup 
 
*Final Kansas Water Rights dataset with D-I-D groups (Dataset 4) 
 
********************************************* 





//Step 4: Merge the 2 datasets matching on WR_ID and PDIV_ID 
 
* Start with D-I-D groups (Dataset 4) 
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use "..\dataAnalysis\Model and Output files\5 Mile PDIV\ 
Cleaned_Sheridan_LEMA_5Mile_COMPLETE.dta", clear 
 
* Add in Water and Weather (Dataset 3) 
merge 1:m WR_ID PDIV_ID using "..\Water_Use_WEATHER_WR.dta", /// 
keep(match) 
*Already limited to D-I-D groups, but confirm below 
drop if LEMA == . 
drop if FIVE_MILE == . 
sort WUA_YEAR 
 
*Already limited to Irrigated Users, but confirm below 
keep if UMW_CODE == "IRR" 
//Step 5: Create a pre/post LEMA Policy Variable 
gen postLEMA = 0 
replace postLEMA = 1 if WUA_YEAR >= 2013 
generate LEMA_EFFECT = postLEMA*LEMA 
 
//Step 6: Create Crop and Irrigation Code Variables 
 
*Create a variable that indicates the proportion of each observation planted to 
*each crop and account for crop codes with multiple crops 
 
gen ALFALFA=0 
replace ALFALFA=. if CROP_CODE==. 
replace ALFALFA=1 if CROP_CODE==1 
replace ALFALFA=1/2 if CROP_CODE==18 | CROP_CODE==19 | CROP_CODE==20 | /// 
CROP_CODE==21 | CROP_CODE==22 
replace ALFALFA=1/3 if CROP_CODE==33 | CROP_CODE==34 | CROP_CODE==35 | /// 
CROP_CODE==36 | CROP_CODE==37 | CROP_CODE==38 | CROP_CODE==39 | /// 
CROP_CODE==40 | CROP_CODE==41 | CROP_CODE==42 
replace ALFALFA=1/4 if CROP_CODE==53 | CROP_CODE==54 | CROP_CODE==55 | /// 
CROP_CODE==56 | CROP_CODE==57 | CROP_CODE==58 | CROP_CODE==59 | /// 
CROP_CODE==60 | CROP_CODE==61 | CROP_CODE==62 
 
gen CORN=0 
replace CORN=. if CROP_CODE==. 
replace CORN=1 if CROP_CODE==2 
replace CORN=1/2 if CROP_CODE==18 | CROP_CODE==23 | CROP_CODE==24 | /// 
CROP_CODE==25 | CROP_CODE==26 
replace CORN=1/3 if CROP_CODE==33 | CROP_CODE==34 | CROP_CODE==35 | /// 
CROP_CODE==36 | CROP_CODE==43 | CROP_CODE==44 | CROP_CODE==45 | /// 
CROP_CODE==46 | CROP_CODE==47 | CROP_CODE==48 
replace CORN=1/4 if CROP_CODE==53 | CROP_CODE==54 | CROP_CODE==55 | /// 
CROP_CODE==56 | CROP_CODE==57 | CROP_CODE==58 | CROP_CODE==63 | /// 
CROP_CODE==64 | CROP_CODE==65 | CROP_CODE==66 
 
gen SORGHUM=0 
replace SORGHUM=. if CROP_CODE==. 
replace SORGHUM=1 if CROP_CODE==3 
replace SORGHUM=1/2 if CROP_CODE==19 | CROP_CODE==23 | CROP_CODE==27 | /// 
CROP_CODE==28 | CROP_CODE==29 
replace SORGHUM=1/3 if CROP_CODE==33 | CROP_CODE==37 | CROP_CODE==38 | /// 
CROP_CODE==39 | CROP_CODE==43 | CROP_CODE==44 | CROP_CODE==45 | /// 
CROP_CODE==49 | CROP_CODE==50 | CROP_CODE==51 
replace SORGHUM=1/4 if CROP_CODE==53 | CROP_CODE==54 | CROP_CODE==55 | /// 
CROP_CODE==59 | CROP_CODE==60 | CROP_CODE==61 | CROP_CODE==63 | /// 
CROP_CODE==64 | CROP_CODE==65 | CROP_CODE==67 
 
gen SOYBEAN=0 
replace SOYBEAN=. if CROP_CODE==. 
replace SOYBEAN=1 if CROP_CODE==4 
replace SOYBEAN=1/2 if CROP_CODE==20 | CROP_CODE==24 | CROP_CODE==27 | /// 
CROP_CODE==30 | CROP_CODE==31 
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replace SOYBEAN=1/3 if CROP_CODE==34 | CROP_CODE==37 | CROP_CODE==40 | /// 
CROP_CODE==41 | CROP_CODE==43 | CROP_CODE==46 | CROP_CODE==47 | /// 
CROP_CODE==49 | CROP_CODE==50 | CROP_CODE==52 
replace SOYBEAN=1/4 if CROP_CODE==53 | CROP_CODE==56 | CROP_CODE==57 | /// 
CROP_CODE==59 | CROP_CODE==60 | CROP_CODE==62 | CROP_CODE==63 | /// 
CROP_CODE==64 | CROP_CODE==66 | CROP_CODE==67 
 
gen WHEAT=0 
replace WHEAT=. if CROP_CODE==. 
replace WHEAT=1 if CROP_CODE==5 
replace WHEAT=1/2 if CROP_CODE==21 | CROP_CODE==25 | CROP_CODE==28 | /// 
CROP_CODE==30 | CROP_CODE==32 
replace WHEAT=1/3 if CROP_CODE==35 | CROP_CODE==38 | CROP_CODE==40 | /// 
CROP_CODE==42 | CROP_CODE==44 | CROP_CODE==46 | CROP_CODE==48 | /// 
CROP_CODE==49 | CROP_CODE==51 | CROP_CODE==52 
replace WHEAT=1/4 if CROP_CODE==54 | CROP_CODE==56 | CROP_CODE==58 | /// 
CROP_CODE==59 | CROP_CODE==61 | CROP_CODE==62 | CROP_CODE==63 | /// 
CROP_CODE==65 | CROP_CODE==66 | CROP_CODE==67 
 
gen MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN=0 
replace MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN=. if CROP_CODE==. 
replace MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN=1 if CROP_CODE==16 | CROP_CODE==17 
 
gen OTHER_CROP=0 
replace OTHER_CROP=. if CROP_CODE==. 
replace OTHER_CROP=1 if CROP_CODE==6 | CROP_CODE==7 | CROP_CODE==8 | /// 
CROP_CODE==9 | CROP_CODE==10 | CROP_CODE==11 | CROP_CODE==12 | /// 
CROP_CODE==13 | CROP_CODE==14 | CROP_CODE==15 | CROP_CODE==68 | /// 
CROP_CODE==69 | CROP_CODE==70 | CROP_CODE==71 | CROP_CODE==72 | /// 
CROP_CODE==73 | CROP_CODE==74 | CROP_CODE==75 | CROP_CODE==76 | /// 
CROP_CODE==77 | CROP_CODE==78 
*Create dummy variables for each irrigation system 
generate IRR_FLOOD = 0 
replace IRR_FLOOD = . if TYPE_SYSTEM == . 
replace IRR_FLOOD = 1 if TYPE_SYSTEM == 1 
 
generate IRR_DRIP = 0 
replace IRR_DRIP = . if TYPE_SYSTEM == . 
replace IRR_DRIP = 1 if TYPE_SYSTEM == 2 
 
generate IRR_PIVOT = 0 
replace IRR_PIVOT = . if TYPE_SYSTEM == . 
replace IRR_PIVOT = 1 if TYPE_SYSTEM == 3 
 
generate IRR_PIVOTDROP = 0 
replace IRR_PIVOTDROP = . if TYPE_SYSTEM == . 
replace IRR_PIVOTDROP = 1 if TYPE_SYSTEM == 4 
 
generate IRR_SPRINKLER = 0 
replace IRR_SPRINKLER = . if TYPE_SYSTEM == . 
replace IRR_SPRINKLER = 1 if TYPE_SYSTEM == 5 
 
generate IRR_PIVOTFLOOD = 0 
replace IRR_PIVOTFLOOD = . if TYPE_SYSTEM == . 
replace IRR_PIVOTFLOOD = 1 if TYPE_SYSTEM == 6 
 
generate IRR_DRIPOTHER = 0 
replace IRR_DRIPOTHER = . if TYPE_SYSTEM == . 
replace IRR_DRIPOTHER = 1 if TYPE_SYSTEM == 7 
 
generate IRR_OTHER = 0 
replace IRR_OTHER = . if TYPE_SYSTEM == . 
replace IRR_OTHER = 1 if TYPE_SYSTEM == 8 
 
//Step 7: Estimate the means of each ACRES IRR, ACRE FEET USED, WEATHER, 
//CROP TYPE and SYSTEM variable using a weighted mean using acres irrigated as the 




collapse (rawsum) AF_USED ACRES_IRR (mean) ppt ET0 ALFALFA CORN 
SORGHUM SOYBEAN WHEAT MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN OTHER_CROP IRR_FLOOD IRR_DRIP /// 
IRR_PIVOT IRR_PIVOTDROP IRR_SPRINKLER IRR_PIVOTFLOOD IRR_DRIPOTHER /// 
IRR_OTHER LEMA FIVE_MILE postLEMA LEMA_EFFECT [aweight=ACRES_IRR], /// 
by(WUA_YEAR WR_ID WUAPERS_ID TACRES_IRR NACRES_IRR) 
sort WR_ID WUA_YEAR 
duplicates report WR_ID WUA_YEAR 
sum 
*Create Intensive marginal variables 
gen APPLIED_INCH = (AF_USED*12) 
gen INTENSITY = (APPLIED_INCH/ACRES_IRR) 
 
*Final Water Policy D-I-D data with WR_ID and PDIV_ID (Dataset 4) 
 
*********************************************  












//Step 1: Set up the Model and generate log-form dependent variables 
//Following the methodology in Hendricks and Peterson (2012) to calculate 
//Marginal Effects but using the log form to obtain straghtforward 
//interpretations of the coefficients as elasticities 
 
use "..\DID_LEMA_Dataset_WEATHER_WR.dta" 
xtset WR_ID WUA_YEAR, yearly 







*Table 1: Summary Statistics of D-I-D Groups Comparison of Means Pre-Policy 
 
*Following Villa (2014) balancing t-test of the difference in the means of the 
*covariates between the control and treated groups in period == 0 based on the 
*kernel weight. 
 
diff lnAPPLIED_INCH lnACRES_IRR lnINTENSITY, t(LEMA) p(postLEMA) kernel /// 
cov(IRR_FLOOD IRR_DRIP IRR_PIVOT IRR_PIVOTDROP IRR_SPRINKLER /// 
IRR_PIVOTFLOOD IRR_DRIPOTHER IRR_OTHER ALFALFA CORN SORGHUM /// 
SOYBEAN WHEAT MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN OTHER_CROP ppt ET0 ) id(WR_ID) /// 
robust cluster(WR_ID) test 
 
diff lnACRES_IRR lnACRES_IRR lnINTENSITY, t(LEMA) p(postLEMA) kernel /// 
cov(IRR_FLOOD IRR_DRIP IRR_PIVOT IRR_PIVOTDROP IRR_SPRINKLER /// 
IRR_PIVOTFLOOD IRR_DRIPOTHER IRR_OTHER ALFALFA CORN SORGHUM /// 
SOYBEAN WHEAT MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN OTHER_CROP ppt ET0 ) id(WR_ID) /// 
robust cluster(WR_ID) test 
 
diff lnINTENSITY lnACRES_IRR lnINTENSITY, t(LEMA) p(postLEMA) kernel /// 
cov(IRR_FLOOD IRR_DRIP IRR_PIVOT IRR_PIVOTDROP IRR_SPRINKLER /// 
IRR_PIVOTFLOOD IRR_DRIPOTHER IRR_OTHER ALFALFA CORN SORGHUM /// 
SOYBEAN WHEAT MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN OTHER_CROP ppt ET0 ) id(WR_ID) /// 
robust cluster(WR_ID) test 
 
summ IRR_FLOOD IRR_DRIP IRR_PIVOT IRR_PIVOTDROP IRR_SPRINKLER /// 
IRR_PIVOTFLOOD IRR_DRIPOTHER IRR_OTHER ALFALFA CORN SORGHUM /// 
SOYBEAN WHEAT MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN OTHER_CROP ppt ET0 
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*Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
summ LEMA LEMA_EFFECT postLEMA if LEMA==1 
 
//Step 2: Visual Analysis (D-I-D) 
 
*Figure 6: Total Extensive and Intensive Marginal Effects 
egen A_PRE_ALL = mean(ACRES_IRR)     if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1 
egen A_POST_ALL = mean(ACRES_IRR)     if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 1 
egen A_FIVEPRE_ALL = mean(ACRES_IRR)  if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 0 
egen A_FIVEPOST_ALL = mean(ACRES_IRR) if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 0 
 
egen I_PRE_ALL = mean(INTENSITY)     if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1 
egen I_POST_ALL = mean(INTENSITY)     if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 1 
egen I_FIVEPRE_ALL = mean(INTENSITY)  if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 0 
egen I_FIVEPOST_ALL = mean(INTENSITY) if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 0 
 
*Figure 7: Crop Specific Extensive Marginal Effects 
egen A_PRE_ALF = mean(ACRES_IRR*ALFALFA) if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 
1 egen A_PRE_CRN = mean(ACRES_IRR*CORN) if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1 
egen A_PRE_SOR = mean(ACRES_IRR*SORGHUM) if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 
1 egen A_PRE_SOY = mean(ACRES_IRR*SOYBEAN) if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA 
== 1 egen A_PRE_WHT = mean(ACRES_IRR*WHEAT)   if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA 
== 1 
egen A_PRE_MLT = mean(ACRES_IRR*MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN)  /// 
if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1 
 
egen A_POST_ALF = mean(ACRES_IRR*ALFALFA) if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 
1 egen A_POST_CRN = mean(ACRES_IRR*CORN) if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 1 
egen A_POST_SOR = mean(ACRES_IRR*SORGHUM) if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 
1 egen A_POST_SOY = mean(ACRES_IRR*SOYBEAN) if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA 
== 1 egen A_POST_WHT = mean(ACRES_IRR*WHEAT) if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA 
== 1 
egen A_POST_MLT = mean(ACRES_IRR*MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN) /// 
if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 1 
 
egen A_FIVEPRE_ALF = mean(ACRES_IRR*ALFALFA) if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 
0 egen A_FIVEPRE_CRN = mean(ACRES_IRR*CORN) if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 0 
egen A_FIVEPRE_SOR = mean(ACRES_IRR*SORGHUM) if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 
0 egen A_FIVEPRE_SOY = mean(ACRES_IRR*SOYBEAN) if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 
0 egen A_FIVEPRE_WHT = mean(ACRES_IRR*WHEAT)   if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA 
== 0 
egen A_FIVEPRE_MLT = mean(ACRES_IRR*MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN)   /// 
if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 0 
 
egen A_FIVEPOST_ALF = mean(ACRES_IRR*ALFALFA) if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 
0 egen A_FIVEPOST_CRN = mean(ACRES_IRR*CORN) if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 0 
egen A_FIVEPOST_SOR = mean(ACRES_IRR*SORGHUM) if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 
0 egen A_FIVEPOST_SOY = mean(ACRES_IRR*SOYBEAN) if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 
0 egen A_FIVEPOST_WHT = mean(ACRES_IRR*WHEAT) if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 
0 egen A_FIVEPOST_MLT = mean(ACRES_IRR*MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN)  /// 
if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 0 
 
 
*Table of summary statistics 
summ 
*Additional analysis done in excel to generate "counterfactual" and graphs 
 
* Crop Specific Intensive Marginal Effects 
mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1 and 
ALFALFA==1 mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 1 
and ALFALFA==1 mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA 
== 0 and ALFALFA==1 mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and 
LEMA == 0 and ALFALFA==1 
 
mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1 and 
CORN==1 mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 1 
and CORN==1 mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA 
== 0 and CORN==1 mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and 
LEMA == 0 and CORN==1 
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capture mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1 and 
SORGHUM==1 mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 1 and 
SORGHUM==1 
mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 0 and 
SORGHUM==1 mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 0 and 
SORGHUM==1 
 
mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1 and 
SOYBEAN==1 mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 1 
and SOYBEAN==1 mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA 
== 0 and SOYBEAN==1 mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and 
LEMA == 0 and SOYBEAN==1 
 
mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1 and 
WHEAT==1 mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 1 
and WHEAT==1 mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 
0 and WHEAT==1 mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA 
== 0 and WHEAT==1 
 
mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1 and 
MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN==1 mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 1 
and MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN==1 mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA 
== 0 and MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN==1 mean INTENSITY if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and 
LEMA == 0 and MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN==1 
 
mean ppt if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1 
mean ppt if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 1 
mean ppt if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 0 
mean ppt if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 0 
 
* IRR_FLOOD IRR_DRIP IRR_PIVOT IRR_PIVOTDROP IRR_SPRINKLER 




mean flood_acres if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1 
mean flood_acres if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 1 
mean flood_acres if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 0 
mean flood_acres if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 0 
 
mean pivotdrop_acres if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 
1 mean pivotdrop_acres if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 
1 mean pivotdrop_acres if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA 
== 0 mean pivotdrop_acres if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA 
== 0 
 
mean pivot_acres if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1 
mean pivot_acres if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 1 
mean pivot_acres if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 0 
mean pivot_acres if WUA_YEAR > 2012 and LEMA == 0 
 
//Step 3: Marginal Estimates 
 
*Table 2: Preferred Model Fixed Effects regression estimates 
*Generate Farmer-Time Specific Variables 
egen f = group(WUAPERS_ID) 
egen FARMER = group(WUAPERS_ID WUA_YEAR) 
sort f 
set matsize 1500 
set emptycells drop 
 
* Total Extensive Margin 
 
xtreg lnACRES_IRR LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
estimates store EXTENSIVE 
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* Total Intensive Margin 
 
xtreg lnINTENSITY LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
estimates store INTENSIVE 
 
* Direct Intensive Margin (Crop Controls) 
 
xtreg lnINTENSITY LEMA_EFFECT ALFALFA CORN SORGHUM SOYBEAN WHEAT ppt ET0 /// 
i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR, fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
estimates store INTENSIVE_DIRECT_1 
 
estimates table EXTENSIVE INTENSIVE INTENSIVE_DIRECT_1 /// 
,star stats(N r2 r2_a) 
 
*Table 3: Preferred Model Fixed Effects regression estimates 
 
*Indirect Intensive Margin 
 
//(You can get the effect due to changes in cropping patterns by 
//taking the Total Intensive - Direct Intensive) 
 
*Total Marginal Effect 
 
xtreg lnAPPLIED_INCH LEMA_EFFECT i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR ppt ET0, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
estimates store TOTAL 
 
//Step 4: Modification to consider disporportionate water use 
clear 
set more off 
use "..\DID_LEMA_Dataset_WR_PDIV.dta" 
keep if WUA_YEAR>=2009 
keep if LEMA ==1 
*Generate Farmer-Time Specific Variables 
egen f = group(WUAPERS_ID) 
egen FARMER = group(WUAPERS_ID WUA_YEAR) 
sort f 
set matsize 1500 
set emptycells drop 
 
*Count PDIV by Year and Irrigator ID (# of wells) 
gen A=PDIV_ID 
 
collapse (count)A, /// 
by(WUA_YEAR WUAPERS_ID) 
sort WUAPERS_ID WUA_YEAR 
 




*Generate Large Well Dummy Variable 
gen LARGE= 0 
replace LARGE =1 if A>=2 and LEMA==1 
summ LARGE 
gen LEMA_LARGE = (LEMA_EFFECT*LARGE) 
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xtset WR_ID WUA_YEAR 
xtdescribe 
 
*Table 4: Disproportionate Fixed Effects 
*Generate Farmer-Time Specific Variables 
egen f = group(WUAPERS_ID) 
egen FARMER = group(WUAPERS_ID WUA_YEAR) 
sort f 
set matsize 1500 






xtreg lnAPPLIED_INCH LEMA_EFFECT LEMA_LARGE i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR ppt ET0, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_LARGE]))-1)*100 
estimates store L_TOTAL 
 
xtreg lnINTENSITY LEMA_EFFECT LEMA_LARGE i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR ppt ET0, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_LARGE]))-1)*100 
estimates store L_INTENSITY 
 
xtreg lnACRES_IRR LEMA_EFFECT LEMA_LARGE i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR ppt ET0, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 




estimates store L_ACRES_IRR 
 
estimates table L_TOTAL L_INTENSITY L_ACRES_IRR ,star stats(N r2 r2_a) 
 
//Step 5: Water Policy Event Study 
set more off 
clear 
use "..\DID_LEMA_Dataset_WEATHER_WR.dta" 
xtset WR_ID WUA_YEAR, yearly 
keep if WUA_YEAR>=2009 
*Generate Farmer-Time Specific Variables 
egen f = group(WUAPERS_ID) 
egen FARMER = group(WUAPERS_ID WUA_YEAR) 
sort f 
set matsize 1500 
set emptycells drop 







replace Policy_Event=1 if d.LEMA_EFFECT==1 
gen _2014=0 
replace _2014=1 if L1.Policy_Event==1 
gen _2012=0 
replace _2012=1 if F1.Policy_Event==1 
gen _2011=0 
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replace _2011=1 if F2.Policy_Event==1 
gen _2010=0 
replace _2010=1 if F3.Policy_Event==1 
gen _2009=0 
replace _2009=1 if F4.Policy_Event==1 
label var _2010 "2010" 
*Figure 9: Total Extensive and Total Intensive 
 
* Total Effect 
set scheme s2mono 
xtreg lnAPPLIED_INCH _2010 _2011 _2012 Policy_Event _2014 i.FARMER /// 
i.WUA_YEAR ppt ET0, fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
margins, dydx (_2010 _2011 _2012 Policy_Event _2014) 
marginsplot, yline(0)   plotopts(connect(i)) /// 
xlabel(1 "2010" 2 "2011" 3 "2012" 4 "Policy Event" 5 "2014") /// 
xtitle("") ytitle("Relative Change in Water Use") title("Total Response")/// 
graphregion(color(white)) scale(1.25) ylabel(,nogrid) 
graph export "..\..\Dissertation\Dissertation\EventStudy\Total_1.pdf", 
replace 
 
* Total Extensive Margin 
 
xtreg lnACRES_IRR _2010 _2011 _2012 Policy_Event _2014 i.FARMER /// 
i.WUA_YEAR ppt ET0, fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
margins, dydx ( _2010 _2011 _2012 Policy_Event _2014) 
marginsplot, yline(0)   plotopts(connect(i)) /// 
xlabel(1 "2010" 2 "2011" 3 "2012" 4 "Policy Event" 5 "2014") /// 
xtitle("") ytitle("Relative Change in Water Use") title 
("Extensive Margin Response") /// 
graphregion(color(white)) scale(1.25) ylabel(,nogrid) 
graph export "..\..\Dissertation\Dissertation\EventStudy\Extensive_1.pdf", 
replace 
 
* Total Intensive Margin 
 
xtreg lnINTENSITY _2010 _2011 _2012 Policy_Event _2014 i.FARMER /// 
i.WUA_YEAR ppt ET0, fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
margins, dydx (_2010 _2011 _2012 Policy_Event _2014) 
marginsplot, yline(0)   plotopts(connect(i)) 
xlabel(1 "2010" 2 "2011" 3 "2012" 4 "Policy Event" 5 "2014") /// 
xtitle("") ytitle("Relative Change in Water Use") 
title("Total Intensive Margin Response") /// 
graphregion(color(white)) scale(1.25) ylabel(,nogrid) 
graph export "..\..\Dissertation\Dissertation\EventStudy\Intensive_1.pdf", 
replace 
 
* Direct Intensive Margin 
 
xtreg lnINTENSITY _2010 _2011 _2012 Policy_Event _2014 ALFALFA CORN /// 
SORGHUM SOYBEAN WHEAT i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR ppt ET0, fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
margins, dydx (_2010 _2011 _2012 Policy_Event _2014) 
marginsplot, yline(0)   plotopts(connect(i)) 
xlabel(1 "2010" 2 "2011" 3 "2012" 4 "Policy Event" 5 "2014") /// 
xtitle("") ytitle("Relative Change in Water Use") 
title("Direct Intensive Margin Response") /// 
graphregion(color(white)) scale(1.25) ylabel(,nogrid) 
replace 
graph export "..\..\Dissertation\Dissertation\EventStudy\ 
Intensive_Direct.pdf", replace 
 
//Step 6: Compare Estimates with alternative specifications 
 
*Table 4:Log (Total Effect) Applied Inches 
 
*The Standard D-I-D specification with no controls 
xtreg lnAPPLIED_INCH LEMA_EFFECT i.WUA_YEAR , fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
estimates store DID 
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*Fixed Effects Model Without Farmer-Time Specific Controls 
xtreg lnAPPLIED_INCH LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.WUA_YEAR , fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
estimates store FARMER 
 
*Fixed Effects Model Without Weather Controls 
xtreg lnAPPLIED_INCH LEMA_EFFECT i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR, fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
estimates store WEATHER 
 
*Fixed Effects Model As Specified 
xtreg lnAPPLIED_INCH LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
estimates store NO_CORRECT 
 
estimates table DID FARMER WEATHER NO_CORRECT,star stats(N r2 r2_a) 
 
//Step 7: Falsification Tests 
 
*Table 9: Comparison of 5 Mile and 10 Mile (identical steps as LEMA and 5 Mile) 
*********************************(Still need to modify Weather merge)****** 
*Create 10 mile and 5 Mile Dataset 
clear 
set more off 
import delimited "..\dataAnalysis\Model and Output files\5 Mile PDIV\ 
Sheridan_LEMA_5Mile_Export_Output.csv" 
duplicates drop fpdiv_key, force 
generate FIVE_MILE = 1 
generate TEN_MILE = 0 
drop fid wrf_active right_type vcnty_code wr_num wr_qual wrf_status /// 
source s_umw priority fpv_active twp_dir rng_dir dwr_id feet_north /// 
feet_west qual_four qual_three qual_two qual_one fo_num basin_num /// 
basin_name gwmd_num cnty_abrev sua_code stream_num num_wells lot_number /// 
lot_qual1 lot_qual2 fpdiv_comm fpdiv_key wrf_key longitude latitude /// 
quant_id quant_unit qstor_ind rate_id rate_unit rstor_ind last_name /// 
first_name wris_date file_id auth_quant add_quant auth_rate add_rate /// 
sect rng twp grp_wr_cnt grp_pd_cnt 
generate WR_ID = wr_id 
drop wr_id 
generate PDIV_ID = pdiv_id 
drop pdiv_id 
generate UMW_CODE = umw_code 
drop umw_code 
keep if UMW_CODE=="IRR" 
egen unique = concat (WR_ID PDIV_ID) 
duplicates report unique 
save "..\dataAnalysis\Model and Output files\5 Mile PDIV\ 
Cleaned_10_Mile_5Mile_Export_Output.dta", replace 
clear 
import delimited "..\dataRaw\PDIV_10Mile.csv", 
duplicates drop fpdiv_key, force 
generate TEN_MILE = 1 
generate FIVE_MILE = 0 
drop fid wrf_active right_type vcnty_code wr_num wr_qual wrf_status /// 
source s_umw priority fpv_active twp_dir rng_dir dwr_id feet_north /// 
feet_west qual_four qual_three qual_two qual_one fo_num basin_num /// 
basin_name gwmd_num cnty_abrev sua_code stream_num num_wells lot_number /// 
lot_qual1 lot_qual2 fpdiv_comm fpdiv_key wrf_key longitude latitude /// 
quant_id quant_unit qstor_ind rate_id rate_unit rstor_ind last_name /// 
first_name wris_date file_id auth_quant add_quant auth_rate add_rate /// 
sect rng twp grp_wr_cnt grp_pd_cnt 
destring wr_id, generate(WR_ID) ignore(",") float 
drop wr_id 
destring pdiv_id, generate(PDIV_ID) ignore(",") float 
drop pdiv_id 
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destring wr_group, generate(WR_GROUP) ignore(",") float 
drop wr_group 
generate UMW_CODE = umw_code 
drop umw_code 
keep if UMW_CODE=="IRR" 
egen unique = concat (WR_ID PDIV_ID) 
duplicates report unique 
save "..\dataAnalysis\Model and Output files\5 Mile PDIV\ 
Cleaned_10_MILE_Export_Output.dta", replace 
append using "..\dataAnalysis\Model and Output files\ 
5 Mile PDIV\Cleaned_10_Mile_5Mile_Export_Output.dta", force 
duplicates report unique 
generate TACRES_IRR = tacres_irr 
 
drop tacres_irr 
generate NACRES_IRR = nacres_irr 
drop nacres_irr 
duplicates report WR_ID PDIV_ID 
duplicates tag WR_ID PDIV_ID, gen(dup) 
list if dup==1 
drop if dup==1 and FIVE_MILE==1 
duplicates report WR_ID PDIV_ID 
drop dup 
save "..\dataAnalysis\Model and Output files\5 Mile PDIV\ 
Cleaned_10_Mile_5Mile_COMPLETE.dta", replace 
clear 
use "..\dataRaw\Cleaned_Water_Use_1991_2014_Export_Output.dta", clear 
keep if CNTY_ABREV=="TH" | CNTY_ABREV=="SH" 
keep if UMW_CODE == "IRR" 
duplicates report unique WUA_YEAR 
duplicates drop 
merge m:1 WR_ID PDIV_ID UMW_CODE using "..\dataAnalysis\ 
Model and Output files\5 Mile PDIV\Cleaned_10_Mile_5Mile_COMPLETE.dta", 
keep(match) force 
save "..\dataRaw\Cleaned_Water_Use_1991_2014_With10Mileand5Mile.dta", 
replace drop if TEN_MILE == . 
drop if FIVE_MILE == . 
sort WUA_YEAR 
gen postLEMA = 0 
replace postLEMA = 1 if WUA_YEAR >= 2013 
generate LEMA_EFFECT = postLEMA*FIVE_MILE 
sort WR_ID WUA_YEAR 
gen ALFALFA=0 
replace ALFALFA=. if CROP_CODE==. 
replace ALFALFA=1 if CROP_CODE==1 
replace ALFALFA=1/2 if CROP_CODE==18 | CROP_CODE==19 | CROP_CODE==20 | /// 
CROP_CODE==21 | CROP_CODE==22 
replace ALFALFA=1/3 if CROP_CODE==33 | CROP_CODE==34 | CROP_CODE==35 | /// 
CROP_CODE==36 | CROP_CODE==37 | CROP_CODE==38 | CROP_CODE==39 | /// 
CROP_CODE==40 | CROP_CODE==41 | CROP_CODE==42 
replace ALFALFA=1/4 if CROP_CODE==53 | CROP_CODE==54 | CROP_CODE==55 | /// 
CROP_CODE==56 | CROP_CODE==57 | CROP_CODE==58 | CROP_CODE==59 | /// 
CROP_CODE==60 | CROP_CODE==61 | CROP_CODE==62 
gen CORN=0 
replace CORN=. if CROP_CODE==. 
replace CORN=1 if CROP_CODE==2 
replace CORN=1/2 if CROP_CODE==18 | CROP_CODE==23 | CROP_CODE==24 | /// 
CROP_CODE==25 | CROP_CODE==26 
replace CORN=1/3 if CROP_CODE==33 | CROP_CODE==34 | CROP_CODE==35 | /// 
CROP_CODE==36 | CROP_CODE==43 | CROP_CODE==44 | CROP_CODE==45 | /// 
CROP_CODE==46 | CROP_CODE==47 | CROP_CODE==48 
replace CORN=1/4 if CROP_CODE==53 | CROP_CODE==54 | CROP_CODE==55 | /// 
CROP_CODE==56 | CROP_CODE==57 | CROP_CODE==58 | CROP_CODE==63 | /// 
CROP_CODE==64 | CROP_CODE==65 | CROP_CODE==66 
gen SORGHUM=0 
replace SORGHUM=. if CROP_CODE==. 
replace SORGHUM=1 if CROP_CODE==3 
replace SORGHUM=1/2 if CROP_CODE==19 | CROP_CODE==23 | CROP_CODE==27 | /// 
CROP_CODE==28 | CROP_CODE==29 
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replace SORGHUM=1/3 if CROP_CODE==33 | CROP_CODE==37 | CROP_CODE==38 | /// 
CROP_CODE==39 | CROP_CODE==43 | CROP_CODE==44 | CROP_CODE==45 | /// 
CROP_CODE==49 | CROP_CODE==50 | CROP_CODE==51 
replace SORGHUM=1/4 if CROP_CODE==53 | CROP_CODE==54 | CROP_CODE==55 | /// 
CROP_CODE==59 | CROP_CODE==60 | CROP_CODE==61 | CROP_CODE==63 | /// 
CROP_CODE==64 | CROP_CODE==65 | CROP_CODE==67 
gen SOYBEAN=0 
replace SOYBEAN=. if CROP_CODE==. 
replace SOYBEAN=1 if CROP_CODE==4 
replace SOYBEAN=1/2 if CROP_CODE==20 | CROP_CODE==24 | CROP_CODE==27 | /// 
CROP_CODE==30 | CROP_CODE==31 
replace SOYBEAN=1/3 if CROP_CODE==34 | CROP_CODE==37 | CROP_CODE==40 | /// 
CROP_CODE==41 | CROP_CODE==43 | CROP_CODE==46 | CROP_CODE==47 | /// 
CROP_CODE==49 | CROP_CODE==50 | CROP_CODE==52 
replace SOYBEAN=1/4 if CROP_CODE==53 | CROP_CODE==56 | CROP_CODE==57 | /// 
CROP_CODE==59 | CROP_CODE==60 | CROP_CODE==62 | CROP_CODE==63 | /// 
CROP_CODE==64 | CROP_CODE==66 | CROP_CODE==67 
gen WHEAT=0 
replace WHEAT=. if CROP_CODE==. 
replace WHEAT=1 if CROP_CODE==5 
replace WHEAT=1/2 if CROP_CODE==21 | CROP_CODE==25 | CROP_CODE==28 | /// 
CROP_CODE==30 | CROP_CODE==32 
replace WHEAT=1/3 if CROP_CODE==35 | CROP_CODE==38 | CROP_CODE==40 | /// 
CROP_CODE==42 | CROP_CODE==44 | CROP_CODE==46 | CROP_CODE==48 | /// 
CROP_CODE==49 | CROP_CODE==51 | CROP_CODE==52 
replace WHEAT=1/4 if CROP_CODE==54 | CROP_CODE==56 | CROP_CODE==58 | /// 
CROP_CODE==59 | CROP_CODE==61 | CROP_CODE==62 | CROP_CODE==63 | /// 
CROP_CODE==65 | CROP_CODE==66 | CROP_CODE==67 
gen MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN=0 
replace MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN=. if CROP_CODE==. 
replace MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN=1 if CROP_CODE==16 | CROP_CODE==17 
gen OTHER_CROP=0 
replace OTHER_CROP=. if CROP_CODE==. 
replace OTHER_CROP=1 if CROP_CODE==6 | CROP_CODE==7 | CROP_CODE==8 | /// 
CROP_CODE==9 | CROP_CODE==10 | CROP_CODE==11 | CROP_CODE==12 | /// 
CROP_CODE==13 | CROP_CODE==14 | CROP_CODE==15 | CROP_CODE==68 | /// 
CROP_CODE==69 | CROP_CODE==70 | CROP_CODE==71 | CROP_CODE==72 | /// 
CROP_CODE==73 | CROP_CODE==74 | CROP_CODE==75 | CROP_CODE==76 | /// 
CROP_CODE==77 | CROP_CODE==78 
 
 
generate IRR_FLOOD = 0 
replace IRR_FLOOD = . if TYPE_SYSTEM == . 
replace IRR_FLOOD = 1 if TYPE_SYSTEM == 1 
generate IRR_DRIP = 0 
replace IRR_DRIP = . if TYPE_SYSTEM == . 
replace IRR_DRIP = 1 if TYPE_SYSTEM == 2 
generate IRR_PIVOT = 0 
replace IRR_PIVOT = . if TYPE_SYSTEM == . 
replace IRR_PIVOT = 1 if TYPE_SYSTEM == 3 
generate IRR_PIVOTDROP = 0 
replace IRR_PIVOTDROP = . if TYPE_SYSTEM == . 
replace IRR_PIVOTDROP = 1 if TYPE_SYSTEM == 4 
generate IRR_SPRINKLER = 0 
replace IRR_SPRINKLER = . if TYPE_SYSTEM == . 
replace IRR_SPRINKLER = 1 if TYPE_SYSTEM == 5 
generate IRR_PIVOTFLOOD = 0 
replace IRR_PIVOTFLOOD = . if TYPE_SYSTEM == . 
replace IRR_PIVOTFLOOD = 1 if TYPE_SYSTEM == 6 
generate IRR_DRIPOTHER = 0 
replace IRR_DRIPOTHER = . if TYPE_SYSTEM == . 
replace IRR_DRIPOTHER = 1 if TYPE_SYSTEM == 7 
generate IRR_OTHER = 0 
replace IRR_OTHER = . if TYPE_SYSTEM == . 
replace IRR_OTHER = 1 if TYPE_SYSTEM == 8 
 
collapse (rawsum) AF_USED ACRES_IRR (mean) ALFALFA CORN SORGHUM SOYBEAN /// 
WHEAT MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN OTHER_CROP IRR_FLOOD IRR_DRIP IRR_PIVOT /// 
IRR_PIVOTDROP IRR_SPRINKLER IRR_PIVOTFLOOD IRR_DRIPOTHER IRR_OTHER /// 
TEN_MILE FIVE_MILE postLEMA LEMA_EFFECT [aweight=ACRES_IRR], /// 
by(WUA_YEAR WR_ID WUAPERS_ID TACRES_IRR NACRES_IRR) 
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sort WR_ID WUA_YEAR 
gen APPLIED_INCH = (AF_USED*12) 
gen INTENSITY = (APPLIED_INCH/ACRES_IRR) 
duplicates report WR_ID WUA_YEAR 
duplicates drop WR_ID WUA_YEAR, force 
merge 1:m WUA_YEAR WR_ID using "..\Water_Use_WEATHER_WR.dta", /// 
keep(match) 
collapse (rawsum) AF_USED ACRES_IRR (mean) ALFALFA CORN SORGHUM SOYBEAN /// 
WHEAT MULTIPLE_UNKNOWN OTHER_CROP IRR_FLOOD IRR_DRIP IRR_PIVOT /// 
IRR_PIVOTDROP IRR_SPRINKLER IRR_PIVOTFLOOD IRR_DRIPOTHER IRR_OTHER /// 
 
TEN_MILE FIVE_MILE postLEMA LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0[aweight=ACRES_IRR], /// 
by(WUA_YEAR WR_ID WUAPERS_ID TACRES_IRR NACRES_IRR) 
sort WR_ID WUA_YEAR 
gen APPLIED_INCH = (AF_USED*12) 
gen INTENSITY = (APPLIED_INCH/ACRES_IRR) 
duplicates report WR_ID WUA_YEAR 
 
*Final 10 Mile Dataset for Analysis (Dataset 5) 
 
*********************************************  
save "..\DID_10MILE_Dataset.dta", replace 
clear 
********************************************* 
*Fixed Effects Model at the Extensive and Intensive Margins 
use "..\DID_10MILE_Dataset.dta" 






egen f = group(WUAPERS_ID) 
egen FARMER = group(WUAPERS_ID WUA_YEAR) 
sort f 
set matsize 1500 
set emptycells drop 
 
* Total Extensive Margin 
xtreg lnACRES_IRR LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
estimates store EXTENSIVE 
 
* Total Intensive Margin 
xtreg lnINTENSITY LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
estimates store INTENSIVE 
 
* Direct Intensive Margin (Crop Controls) 
xtreg lnINTENSITY LEMA_EFFECT ALFALFA CORN SORGHUM SOYBEAN WHEAT ppt ET0 /// 
i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR, fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
estimates store INTENSIVE_DIRECT_1 
 
* Direct Intensive Margin (Crop and System Controls) 
xtreg lnINTENSITY LEMA_EFFECT ALFALFA CORN SORGHUM SOYBEAN /// 
WHEAT IRR_FLOOD IRR_DRIP IRR_PIVOT IRR_PIVOTDROP IRR_SPRINKLER ppt ET0 /// 
IRR_PIVOTFLOOD IRR_DRIPOTHER IRR_OTHER /// 
i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR, fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
estimates store INTENSIVE_DIRECT_2 
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estimates table EXTENSIVE INTENSIVE INTENSIVE_DIRECT_1 /// 
INTENSIVE_DIRECT_2,star stats(N r2 r2_a) 
 
*Total Marginal Effect 
xtreg lnAPPLIED_INCH LEMA_EFFECT i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR ppt ET0, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
estimates store TOTAL 
*False LEMA effect in 2011 
clear 
set more off 
 
use "..\DID_LEMA_Dataset_WEATHER_WR.dta" //(Dataset 4) 
xtset WR_ID WUA_YEAR, yearly 
keep if WUA_YEAR<=2012 
 
gen postFALSE = 0 
replace postFALSE = 1 if WUA_YEAR >= 2011 






egen f = group(WUAPERS_ID) 
egen FARMER = group(WUAPERS_ID WUA_YEAR) 
sort f 
set matsize 1500 
set emptycells drop 
sort WUA_YEAR 
 
xtreg lnAPPLIED_INCH FALSE_EFFECT i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR ppt ET0, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[FALSE_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
estimates store APPLIED_2 
 
xtreg lnACRES_IRR FALSE_EFFECT i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR ppt ET0, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[FALSE_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
estimates store ACRES_2 
 
xtreg lnINTENSITY FALSE_EFFECT i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR ppt ET0, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[FALSE_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
estimates store INTENSITY_2 
 
xtreg lnINTENSITY FALSE_EFFECT ALFALFA CORN SORGHUM SOYBEAN WHEAT /// 
i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR ppt ET0, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[FALSE_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
estimates store INTENSITY_22 
 
estimates table APPLIED_2 ACRES_2 INTENSITY_2 INTENSITY_22, 
star stats(N r2 r2_a) 
 
**************************************************** 
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set more off 
capture log close 





//Step 1: Bring in Table of Estimated Input Expenditures 
import excel "../DID_INPUTS/Input Expenditure Table by Crop Type.xlsx", /// 
sheet("Sheet1") firstrow 
 
*Final Input Expenditure dataset (Dataset 6) 
 
**************************************************** 
 save "../DID_INPUTS/DID_INPUTS.dta", replace clear 
**************************************************** 
 
      //Input Expenditures//  
// Crop Type Fertilizer Herbicide Insecticide Seed Bushels  
// Corn 84.18 48.95 14.57 113.92 225.00  
// Soybeans 18.83 34.95   55.50 60.00  
// Wheat 38.74 6.31   18.00 65.00  
// Sorghum 60.93 41.25   14.92 160.00  






use "..\DID_LEMA_Dataset_WEATHER_WR.dta" //(Dataset 4) 
xtset WR_ID WUA_YEAR, yearly 
keep if WUA_YEAR>=2009 
xtdescribe 
//Step 1: Generate Input Price Variables 
gen FERTILIZER = 0 
replace FERTILIZER = 84.18      if CORN == 1 
replace FERTILIZER = 18.83      if SOYBEAN == 1 
replace FERTILIZER = 38.74  if WHEAT == 1 
replace FERTILIZER = 41.25  if SORGHUM == 1 
replace FERTILIZER = 23.78  if OTHER_CROP == 1 
 
gen HERBICIDE = 0 
replace HERBICIDE = 48.95       if CORN == 1 
replace HERBICIDE = 34.95       if SOYBEAN == 1 
replace HERBICIDE = 6.31        if WHEAT == 1 
replace HERBICIDE = 60.93       if SORGHUM == 1 
replace HERBICIDE = 49.84       if OTHER_CROP == 1 
 
gen INSECTICIDE 
replace INSECTICIDE = 14.5      if CORN == 1 
replace INSECTICIDE = 0         if SOYBEAN == 1 
replace INSECTICIDE = 0         if WHEAT == 1 
replace INSECTICIDE = 0         if SORGHUM == 1 
replace INSECTICIDE = 0         if OTHER_CROP == 1 
 
gen SEED = 0 
replace SEED = 113.92           if CORN == 1 
replace SEED = 55.50             if SOYBEAN == 1 
replace SEED = 18.00             if WHEAT == 1 
replace SEED = 14.92             if SORGHUM == 1 
replace SEED = 16.46             if OTHER_CROP == 1 
 




*Total FERTILIZER EXPENDITURE 
gen CORN_FERTILIZER = CORN*FERTILIZER 
gen SOYBEAN_FERTILIZER = SOYBEAN*FERTILIZER gen 
WHEAT_FERTILIZER = WHEAT*FERTILIZER 
gen SORGHUM_FERTILIZER = SORGHUM*FERTILIZER 
gen ALFALFA_FERTILIZER = OTHER_CROP*FERTILIZER 
gen OTHER_CROP_FERTILIZER = OTHER_CROP*FERTILIZER 
 
*Total HERBICIDE EXPENDITURE 
gen CORN_HERBICIDE = CORN*HERBICIDE 
gen SOYBEAN_HERBICIDE = SOYBEAN*HERBICIDE gen 
WHEAT_HERBICIDE = WHEAT*HERBICIDE 
gen SORGHUM_HERBICIDE = SORGHUM*HERBICIDE 
gen ALFALFA_HERBICIDE = OTHER_CROP*HERBICIDE 
gen OTHER_CROP_HERBICIDE = OTHER_CROP*HERBICIDE 
 
 
*Total INSECTICIDE EXPENDITURE 
gen CORN_INSECTICIDE = CORN*INSECTICIDE 
gen SOYBEAN_INSECTICIDE = SOYBEAN*INSECTICIDE gen 
WHEAT_INSECTICIDE = WHEAT*INSECTICIDE 
gen SORGHUM_INSECTICIDE = SORGHUM*INSECTICIDE 
gen ALFALFA_INSECTICIDE = OTHER_CROP*INSECTICIDE 
gen OTHER_CROP_INSECTICIDE = OTHER_CROP*INSECTICIDE 
 
*Total SEED EXPENDITURE 
gen CORN_SEED = CORN*SEED 
gen SOYBEAN_SEED = SOYBEAN*SEED gen WHEAT_SEED 
= WHEAT*SEED 
gen SORGHUM_SEED = SORGHUM*SEED 
gen ALFALFA_SEED = OTHER_CROP*SEED 




*Final Acreage Input Expenditure dataset (Dataset 7) 
 





use "..\DID_LEMA_Dataset_WEATHER_WR_INPUTS.dta" //(Dataset 7) xtset WR_ID 
WUA_YEAR, yearly 
keep if WUA_YEAR>=2009 xtdescribe 
 




mean CORN   if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1 
mean CORN   if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 1  
mean CORN   if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 0 




mean SOYBEAN if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1  
mean SOYBEAN if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 1  
mean SOYBEAN if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 0  
mean SOYBEAN  if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 0 
 
*WHEAT 
mean WHEAT  if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1 
mean WHEAT  if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 1  
mean WHEAT  if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 0 




mean SORGHUM if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1  
mean SORGHUM if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 1  
mean SORGHUM if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 0  
mean SORGHUM if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 0 
 
*ALFALFA 
mean ALFALFA if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1  
mean ALFALFA if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 1  
mean ALFALFA if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 0  
mean ALFALFA if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 0 
 
*OTHER 
mean OTHER_CROP if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1  
mean OTHER_CROP if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 1  
mean OTHER_CROP if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 0  
mean OTHER_CROP if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 0 
 
*Generate Farmer-Time Specific Variables 
 
egen f = group(WUAPERS_ID) 
egen FARMER = group(WUAPERS_ID WUA_YEAR) sort f 
set matsize 1500 
set emptycells drop 
 
* Share Effects 
 
*CORN 
xtreg CORN LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR, /// fe vce(cluster 
WR_ID) 
summarize CORN_FERTILIZER CORN_HERBICIDE CORN_INSECTICIDE CORN_SEED 
 
*SOYBEAN 
xtreg SOYBEAN LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
summarize SOYBEAN_FERTILIZER SOYBEAN_HERBICIDE /// SOYBEAN_SEED 
 
*WHEAT 
xtreg WHEAT LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR, /// fe 
vce(cluster WR_ID) 




xtreg SORGHUM LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
summarize SORGHUM_FERTILIZER SORGHUM_HERBICIDE SORGHUM_INSECTICIDE /// SORGHUM_SEED 
 
*ALFALFA 
xtreg ALFALFA LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
summarize ALFALFA_FERTILIZER ALFALFA_HERBICIDE ALFALFA_INSECTICIDE /// ALFALFA_SEED 
 
*OTHER 
xtreg OTHER_CROP LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR, /// 
fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
summarize OTHER_CROP_FERTILIZER OTHER_CROP_HERBICIDE /// 
OTHER_CROP_INSECTICIDE OTHER_CROP_SEED 
 
* No farmer-time fixed effects 
 
*CORN 
xtreg CORN LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.WUA_YEAR, /// fe 
vce(cluster WR_ID) 
summarize CORN_FERTILIZER CORN_HERBICIDE CORN_INSECTICIDE CORN_SEED 
 
*SOYBEAN 
xtreg SOYBEAN LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.WUA_YEAR, /// fe vce(cluster 
WR_ID) 
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summarize SOYBEAN_FERTILIZER SOYBEAN_HERBICIDE /// SOYBEAN_SEED 
 
*WHEAT 
xtreg WHEAT LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.WUA_YEAR, /// fe vce(cluster 
WR_ID) 
summarize WHEAT_FERTILIZER WHEAT_HERBICIDE WHEAT_INSECTICIDE WHEAT_SEED 
 
*SORGHUM 
xtreg SORGHUM LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.WUA_YEAR, /// fe vce(cluster 
WR_ID) 
summarize SORGHUM_FERTILIZER SORGHUM_HERBICIDE SORGHUM_INSECTICIDE /// SORGHUM_SEED 
 
*ALFALFA 
xtreg ALFALFA LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.WUA_YEAR, /// fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
summarize ALFALFA_FERTILIZER ALFALFA_HERBICIDE ALFALFA_INSECTICIDE /// ALFALFA_SEED 
 
*OTHER 
xtreg OTHER_CROP LEMA_EFFECT ppt ET0 i.WUA_YEAR, /// fe vce(cluster 
WR_ID) 
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*****************Ch8: Estimates of Effects on Yields******************* 
******************************************************************************** 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// clear 
set more off capture log close 
log using "DID_YIELDS.txt", text replace 
******************************************************************************** 
//ESTIMATE NONLINEAR FUNCTIONS// 
******************************************************************************** 
 
//Step 1: Import Stone Yield Simulation Data 
 
*CORN 
import delimited "..\DID_YIELDS\CORN_STONE.csv", clear //(Dataset 8) reg yield 
c.netirrigationin##c.netirrigationin c.precip##c.precip c.netirrigationin#c.precip 
predict yield_hat 
 
twoway (scatter yield netirrigationin ) /// 
(line yield_hat netirrigationin if precip==11) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==12) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==13) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==14) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==15) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==16) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==17) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==18) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==19) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==20) /// 
(line yield_hat netirrigationin if precip==21), legend(off) /// xtitle("Net 
Irrigation (in)") ytitle("Corn Yield (bu/acre)") graphregion(color(white)) 
 
graph export "corn_yield_function.png", replace 
 
* Show regression lines outside of original data replace precip=24 
if precip==11 
replace precip=27 if precip==12 replace 
precip=31 if precip==13 drop if precip<=21 
drop yield_hat predict yield_hat 
twoway (line yield_hat netirrigationin if precip==24) /// (line 
yield_hat netirrigationin if precip==27) /// 
(line yield_hat netirrigationin if precip==31), legend(off) /// xtitle("Net 




use "..\DID_LEMA_Dataset_WEATHER_WR.dta", clear //(Dataset 4) xtset WR_ID 
WUA_YEAR, yearly 
keep if WUA_YEAR>=2009 
* Net Irrigation is the Intensity times the efficiency gen 
netirrigationin=INTENSITY*0.9 
* Rename preciptitation so that it matches yield regression ren ppt 
precip 
 
predict CORN_YIELD if CORN==1 summ 
CORN_YIELD, detail 
 
scatter CORN_YIELD INTENSITY if CORN==1 
* drop outliers 
summ INTENSITY if CORN==1, detail drop if 
INTENSITY>28 and CORN==1 
scatter CORN_YIELD INTENSITY if CORN==1 
 




import delimited "..\DID_YIELDS\SOYBEAN_STONE.csv", clear 




twoway (scatter yield netirrigationin ) /// 
(line yield_hat netirrigationin if precip==11) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==12) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==13) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==14) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==15) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==16) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==17) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==18) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==19) /// (line yield_hat 
netirrigationin if precip==20) /// 
(line yield_hat netirrigationin if precip==21), legend(off) /// xtitle("Net 
Irrigation (in)") ytitle("Soybean Yield (bu/acre)") graphregion(color(white)) 
 
graph export "soybean_yield_function.png", replace 
 
* Show regression lines outside of original data replace precip=24 
if precip==11 
replace precip=27 if precip==12 replace 
precip=31 if precip==13 drop if precip<=21 
drop yield_hat predict yield_hat 
twoway (line yield_hat netirrigationin if precip==24) /// (line 
yield_hat netirrigationin if precip==27) /// 
(line yield_hat netirrigationin if precip==31), legend(off) /// xtitle("Net 





predict SOYBEAN_YIELD if SOYBEAN==1 summ 
SOYBEAN_YIELD, detail 
 
scatter SOYBEAN_YIELD INTENSITY if SOYBEAN==1 
* drop outliers 
summ INTENSITY if SOYBEAN==1, detail drop if 
INTENSITY>24 and SOYBEAN==1 
scatter SOYBEAN_YIELD INTENSITY if SOYBEAN==1 
 
*Final Water Use Yield Dataset (Dataset 9) 
 
*******************************************************  
save "..\DID_YIELDS\DID_LEMA_Dataset_WEATHER_WR_YIELDS.dta", replace 








use "..\DID_YIELDS\DID_LEMA_Dataset_WEATHER_WR_YIELDS.dta" //(Dataset 9) xtset WR_ID 
WUA_YEAR, yearly 





//Step 1: Visual Analysis (D-I-D) 
 
*CORN 
mean CORN_YIELD  if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1  
mean CORN_YIELD  if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 1  
mean CORN_YIELD  if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 0  
mean CORN_YIELD  if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 0 
 
*SOYBEAN 
mean SOYBEAN_YIELD  if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 1  
mean SOYBEAN_YIELD  if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 1  
mean SOYBEAN_YIELD  if WUA_YEAR <= 2012 and LEMA == 0  
mean SOYBEAN_YIELD   if WUA_YEAR >  2012 and LEMA == 0 
 
*Generate Farmer-Time Specific Variables 
egen f = group(WUAPERS_ID) 
egen FARMER = group(WUAPERS_ID WUA_YEAR) sort f 
set matsize 1500 
set emptycells drop 
 
* Total Effects 
xtreg ln_CORN_YIELD LEMA_EFFECT precip ET0 i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR, /// fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
 
xtreg ln_SOYBEAN_YIELD LEMA_EFFECT precip ET0 i.FARMER i.WUA_YEAR, /// fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
 
* No farmer-time fixed effects 
xtreg ln_CORN_YIELD LEMA_EFFECT precip ET0 i.WUA_YEAR, /// fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 
 
xtreg ln_SOYBEAN_YIELD LEMA_EFFECT precip ET0 i.WUA_YEAR, /// fe vce(cluster WR_ID) 
*Apply Log-Linear Correction 
nlcom ((exp(_b[LEMA_EFFECT]))-1)*100 log close 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
********************************END OF CODE***************************** 
 
 
 
